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What if the absolutely debilitating corruption that we face is a corruption
caused by decent souls, not crooks?  Could America rally to respond then?  Can
we get angry enough about small but systemic distortions that block the ability
of democracy to work if those distortions are the product of good people work-
ing in a corrupted system? I am unsure. – Lawrence Lessig1
I. INTRODUCTION
The setting: Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C.  The time: the last
hours of 2012 and the first hours of 2013.  The rhetoric on all sides:
economic responsibility, albeit differently defined.  The view: peering
over the edge of the so-called fiscal cliff—the expiration of broad tax
cuts and the scheduled onset of draconian spending cuts.2  The Ameri-
can people: finding no room at the K Street Inn and certainly no
seats—much less on both sides of the aisle—akin to those occupied by
a biotech company that, just two weeks earlier, pleaded guilty in a
major federal fraud case.3 The company’s key noncriminal credentials:
a “small army of 74 lobbyists in the capital;”4 its “employees and polit-
ical action committee have distributed nearly $5 million in contribu-
tions to political candidates and committees since 2007, including
$67,750 to [Senator Max] Baucus, the Finance Committee chairman,
and $59,000 to [Senator Orrin] Hatch, the committee’s ranking Re-
publican;”5 and, in a nod to the constitutional requirements of biparti-
san passage and presentment, the company’s lobbyists “show[ed] up
more than a dozen times since 2009 on logs of visits to the White
House” and “gave an additional $73,000 to [Senator Mitch] McCon-
nell, some of it at a fund-raising event for him that [the company]
helped sponsor in December while the debate over the fiscal legisla-
tion was under way.”6
The tragically ironic result: buried in Section 632 of the crisis-
averting, fiscally necessitated law is a paragraph postponing the im-
plementation of a long-scheduled set of Medicare price restraints on
1. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT, at xi–xii (2011).
2. Janet Hook & Siobhan Hughes, Fiscal Cliff Edge Drawing Close in U.S., WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2012, 8:55 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873
23320404578212840882082434.html.
3. Eric Lipton & Kevin Sack, Fiscal Footnote: Big Senate Gift to Drug Maker,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/us/medicare-pric-
ing-delay-is-political-win-for-amgen-drug-maker.html?pagewanted=all&_r= (“On
Dec. 19, as Congressional negotiations over the fiscal bill reached a frenzy,
Amgen pleaded guilty to marketing one of its anti-anemia drugs, Aranesp ille-
gally.  It agreed to pay criminal and civil penalties totaling $762 million, a record
settlement for a biotechnology company, according to the Justice Department.”).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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the company’s lucrative pill for dialysis patients for two years—a de-
lay “projected to cost Medicare up to $500 million over that period.”7
The denouement: champagne corks pop at company headquarters;
bonus season on K Street; Democratic and Republican leaders expand
already burgeoning treasure chests; and, not incidentally the Ameri-
can people—of all political stripes—will pick up the $500 million tab.
The people need a lobby.  The question is whether public campaign
financing remains a robust option.
If public campaign financing is on its deathbed, the eventual au-
topsy will reveal not a fatal blow, but rather a thousand cuts.  The
patient’s wounds have been exacerbated by a neglect born of a dy-
namic in which even episodically broad support for investing in the
democratic process has been routinely thwarted by a shortness of at-
tention span and a shallowness of political will to push such invest-
ment through.
Less patently, but no less significantly, decades of emphasis on
what this article terms the “negatives” or “limits” of campaign finance
as opposed to innovations on the campaign finance “affirmatives”—i.e.
the steps that directly fund and facilitate idea-based rather than dol-
lar-based campaigns—while by definition cheap, have come at a tre-
mendously substantial cost to deliberative democracy.
The prior decade of campaign finance cases eliminates or circum-
scribes many of the key “negatives” that limited certain types of
spending and are thus responsible for dramatically increasing cam-
paign expenditures.  At the same time, the Supreme Court’s 5–4 deci-
sion in Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett8 eliminated the single
“affirmative” mechanism—trigger-matching funds—that made public
financing politically and fiscally viable.
This Article asserts the current predicament of public campaign
financing is this: options that are still on the table under the Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence are, with only rare and idiosyncratic
exceptions, fiscal and political non-starters.  Conversely, options that
would be, and indeed previously had been, fiscally and politically via-
ble, are now, even after years of their routine practice in varied juris-
dictions, no longer constitutional.  It is, in short, simultaneously a
legal and practical dilemma.  Short of highly unlikely swings of the
7. Id.  When asked about the delayed implementation of the planned reimburse-
ment cuts, aides for Senators Baucus and Hatch said the delay was necessary to
give regulators time to prepare for the price change because the price change
would occur at the same time as other changes to kidney treatments and would
require regulators to do “too much and too quickly.”  Id.  However, the planned
reimbursement reduction had already been delayed two years ago ostensibly for
the same reason. Id. Other congressional aides were stunned to find another
two-year delay in the price reduction and called the delay a giveaway to the com-
pany. Id.
8. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
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Supreme Court pendulum, and absent an even more unlikely constitu-
tional amendment, cities, states, and federal government actors, who
might otherwise consider allowing candidates for office to opt for vol-
untary public financing, now find themselves between a legal rock and
a fiscal hard place: unless a jurisdiction adopts, via extraordinarily
high initial lump sum funding that grossly overspends the people’s
money to the point of fiscal ruin, any candidate opting in is effectively
volunteering only to play the role of a sitting duck.  On the more prom-
ising side, this Article asserts that systems that operate based on of-
fering funding as a multiple for small-donor donations offer one
potential solution to the dilemma.  However, the Article ultimately
contends that such systems are particularly vulnerable in jurisdic-
tions with small populations insofar as moneyed interest groups from
outside the jurisdiction can easily overwhelm, for example, even the
multiplied donations of the citizens of largely rural states or
jurisdictions.
By recent standards, the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Free
Enterprise9 was a sleeper.  Relative to the rare campaign finance
blockbuster of Citizens United v. FEC10 or the preceding Term’s
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,11 the Court’s 5–4 decision in Free
Enterprise received relatively little attention outside niche campaign
finance circles.12 Free Enterprise struck down the matching-fund
component of Arizona’s public campaign finance laws.13  The Court
struck down the Arizona campaign finance law because it found the
law imposed a burden on political speech in violation of the First
Amendment.14  Under Arizona’s system, voluntarily participating
candidates would receive an initial allotment of funds, and then, if the
participating candidates were outspent (over various thresholds moni-
tored via ancillary reporting requirements) by nonparticipating, pri-
vately financed opponents and the independent expenditure groups
supporting those opponents, the participating candidates would re-
ceive additional public matching funds.15 Free Enterprise effectively
eliminated the key available mechanism to accommodate democratic
ends of public financing without making the systems so financially
wasteful as to eliminate politically viability.
The force of the holding in Free Enterprise is effectively doubled in
the sense that in striking down Arizona’s matching-funds provision,
the Court simultaneously upholds the concept of public financing as a
9. Id.
10. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
11. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
12. See Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence, in Free En-
terprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2548–49 (2011).
13. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2813–14.
14. Id.
15. Id.
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 62 Side A      12/12/2013   14:12:17
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 62 Side A      12/12/2013   14:12:17
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-2\NEB205.txt unknown Seq: 5 12-DEC-13 14:07
2013] LAST RITES 353
matter of formalism but cripples most actual public financing systems
as a practical matter.  The Court, by holding that public financing
matching-fund systems unduly burden free speech, upheld the princi-
ple of public financing while simultaneously striking a major blow to
public financing systems by invalidating one of the most effective pub-
lic financing systems. Free Enterprise’s prioritization of formalism
was such that, in Justice Kagan’s words in dissent, the “suit, in fact,
may merit less attention than any challenge to a speech subsidy ever
seen in this Court.”16  Contending the matching funds at issue ex-
panded rather than contracted political speech, and noting in support
of that point that the public campaign funds were offered to “any per-
son running for state office,”17
Justice Kagan, dissenting in sustained high dudgeon, notes that
the nonparticipants challenging the scheme “refused that assis-
tance.”18  Accordingly, those challenging the scheme were, in Justice
Kagan’s view, “making a novel argument: that Arizona violated their
First Amendment rights by disbursing funds to other speakers even
though they could have received (but chose to spurn) the same finan-
cial assistance.  Some people might call that chutzpah.”19  Precedent,
practice, and Justice Kagan’s point notwithstanding, Free Enterprise
is now the law.
Drawing from the recent jurisprudence and recent data and dy-
namics in the political realm, this Article analyzes both the legal and
real politick aspects of the new landscape of public financing.  While
not all public financing systems follow the Arizona matching funds
model, most advocates of public financing considered it to be the most
politically viable form of public financing,20 precisely because it pro-
tects the public fisc by keeping initial funding allotments low enough
so as not to needlessly spend taxpayer funds on low-dollar races, non-
competitive contests, or both, while simultaneously assuring candi-
dates considering opting in to public financing (and thus foregoing
significant private funds) that they would, in an expensive or highly
competitive race, actually be able to counter speech with speech.21
This Article asserts the combination of three factors: (1) challenging
federal and state economies; (2) Citizens United’s opening of new fi-
nancial spigots; and (3) the Free Enterprise decision arguably spells
the doom of public financing as we have known it.  The Arizona model
16. Id. at 2835 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d
445, 469 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that “the matching funds provision allows [the
State] to effectively dispense limited resources while allowing participating can-
didates to respond in races where the most debate is generated.”).
21. Id.
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might be justified in a judicial public-financing context by the addi-
tional compelling interests present in that circumstance.  Far from a
mere hypothetical, this argument has direct applicability to North
Carolina, which had a matching-funds system in place prior to Free
Enterprise, the constitutionality of which had been, prior to Free En-
terprise, upheld by the Fourth Circuit.22
Part I situates public campaign financing in the historical and
democratic tradition of the public square, and more pointedly, the fa-
cilitated public square.  In positioning public financing within this
“pre-history” of campaign finance, the Article asserts that the “af-
firmatives” represented by the early kinds of forum creation and
speech fostering and facilitation were entirely consistent with the po-
tential role of public financing in more modern deliberative democracy
and republican governance.  Having so positioned public financing,
the Article then, in a purposefully brief but contextualizing fashion,
considers the evolution of the ancient public square through, for exam-
ple, extended public debates, the likes of which twenty-first century
voters would scarcely recognize.  The Article transitions from those
early “affirmatives” in fostering the public’s political discourse to a
consideration of the early legal and political theories of public financ-
ing as having been, in large measure, continuations and extensions of
the public square.
Building on the theories of public financing, Part II considers the
extent to which those theories have been realized or thwarted by the
legal and logistical aspects of America’s experiments with public fi-
nancing.  This analysis begins with the Presidential Election Cam-
paign Fund Act’s authorization of publicly financed presidential party
nominating conventions, primary elections, and general elections.23
Next, the Article examines the systems adopted in states and
smaller jurisdictions that have embraced public financing.  The Arti-
cle divides these state systems into three categories.  In the first cate-
gory are the systems that—less effectively but less controversially—
track the Federal Election Campaign Act’s (FECA or the Act) presi-
dential public-financing scheme.
The second category consists of the systems that, prior to Free En-
terprise, were generally effective at achieving their ends but are now
unconstitutional.  With respect to the second category, the Article ana-
lyzes the Court’s decision in Free Enterprise, and the room, if any, the
decision leaves for variations of the matching funds struck down by
the Court.
22. N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524
F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008).
23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 86 (1976) (per curiam); David M. Ifshin & Roger E.
Warin, Litigating the 1980 Presidential Election, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 485, 492–94
(1982).
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The third category is comprised of systems and proposals that seek
to forge an alternative to the fixed-sum/Presidential model or the
matching-funds/Free Enterprise model.  The most prominent, and in
some idiosyncratic jurisdictions, successful alternatives involve small-
donor matching funds.  The best-known iteration of such an alterna-
tive exists in the (idiosyncratic to be sure) jurisdiction of New York
City.
With these categories and the legal context in mind, Part III exam-
ines anecdotal and empirical evidence pertaining to modern political
campaigns, both in terms of the now pragmatically moribund presi-
dential public financing system and in terms of the dynamics specific
to the post-Citizens United era.  The Article asserts that, for all the
attention paid to presidential contests, public financing is most impor-
tant at the federal legislative level and in state races for legislative,
executive, and judicial offices alike.  Finally, the Article asserts that
the less populated the jurisdiction but the more important the office—
for example, a U.S. Senate race in North Dakota (population:
699,628)24 with the Senate majority possibly hanging in the balance—
the more vulnerable the people’s interests are to being thwarted in
precisely the manner described at the outset of this Article, in which
the fiscal cliff legislation provided the vehicle to pass on $500 million
in unnecessary Medicare costs to the taxpayers.
II. PUBLIC FINANCING AS PUBLIC SQUARE
“We allow people to speak so others can vote. Speech allows people to vote intel-
ligently and freely, aware of all the options and in possession of all the relevant
information.”25
The political and self-governance roots of America’s First Amend-
ment norms reach at least as far back as ancient Athenian notions of
democracy,26 in which large groups of ordinary citizens assembled to
debate and vote on governmental decisions.27  Every citizen had an
equal opportunity to participate in political decision-making, regard-
less of economic status.28  Athenian “direct” democracy was based on
the very notion that each citizen had the opportunity to persuade his
24. North Dakota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/380
00.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) [hereinafter North Dakota].
25. OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 13 (1996).
26. Keith Werhan, The Classical Athenian Ancestry of American Freedom of Speech,
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 296 (2008); see Ellen Meiksins Wood, Demos Versus “We,
the People”: Freedom and Democracy Ancient and Modern, in DC¸MOKRATIA: A
CONVERSATION ON DEMOCRACIES, ANCIENT AND MODERN 121, 122 (Josiah Ober &
Charles Hedrick eds., 1996).
27. Werhan, supra note 26, at 294–95.
28. Id. (indicating that only adult males registered as citizens were able to partici-
pate in this process); see generally MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN AS-
SEMBLY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES (1987).
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fellow citizens to support his political ideology.29  Political institutions
encouraged citizen volunteers to speak among large groups so that
their fellow citizens could learn to discuss and decide the merits of the
opposing viewpoints.30  Free and open speech ultimately enabled the
Athenian democracy to flourish.31
There were four principal governing institutions in Athens: the As-
sembly, the Council of 500, lawmaking boards, and the jury court.32
These institutions consisted of up to 6,000 citizen volunteers who
would listen to debate and vote on the issues, the outcome of which
was the final decision on law and policy.33
“The Assembly was the centerpiece of the classical Athenian de-
mocracy.”34  It was at the Assembly where both the major policy is-
sues and the minor cases in fact would be decided.35  The Assembly
would meet approximately every ten days, and each citizen had a
right to attend and vote on every issue presented at every session.36
There were no procedural rules limiting the number of speakers or the
length of each speech.37  The herald of the Assembly would begin each
session with the simple, yet simultaneously profound question, “Who
wishes to speak?”38
Euripides described the herald’s invitation to open public debate as
“the call of freedom.”39  There is evidence suggesting that Athenians
regularly participated at the Assembly and that a small group of ora-
tors dominated the session debates.40  The orators were unelected and
possessed no decision-making authority.  Most, in fact, were members
29. Werhan, supra note 26, at 297; see MARK MUNN, THE SCHOOL OF HISTORY: ATH-
ENS IN THE AGE OF SOCRATES 293 (2000) (“All significant enactments of law, polit-
ics, philosophy, and poetry relied on living speech before their respective
audiences.”).
30. Werhan, supra note 26, at 297.
31. See id.; see also Plato, Republic, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 971, 557, 1168 (John
M. Cooper ed., 1997 G. M. A. Grube trans., 1997) (discussing the common notion
that, in a democracy, freedom of speech is the epitome of freedom itself for it gives
everyone the “license to do what he wants”).
32. Werhan, supra note 26, 294–95.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 300.
35. Id. at 300–01; see Claude Mosse´, Inventing Politics, in GREEK THOUGHT: A GUIDE
TO CLASSICAL KNOWLEDGE 147, 154 (Jacques Brunschwig & Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd
eds., Elizabeth Rawlings & Jeannine Pucci trans., 2000).
36. Werhan, supra note 26, at 300–01.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 302; Ryan K. Balot, Free Speech, Courage, and Democratic Deliberation, in
FREE SPEECH IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 233, 233 (Ineke Sluiter & Ralph M. Rosen
eds., 2004) (describing the herald’s call as a “well-known symbol” of free speech).
39. Werhan, supra note 26, at 302; Euripides, The Suppliant Women, 437, in EURIPI-
DES IV, 57, 74 (David Grene & Richard Lattimore eds., Frank Jones trans., 1958).
40. Werhan, supra note 26, at 303; see HANSEN, supra note 28, at 142–46.
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 64 Side A      12/12/2013   14:12:17
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 64 Side A      12/12/2013   14:12:17
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-2\NEB205.txt unknown Seq: 9 12-DEC-13 14:07
2013] LAST RITES 357
of the wealthy elite who had “the skill and courage that debate in the
Athenian Assembly demanded.”41
However, Athenian direct democracy was not free from corruption
and politics.  Plutarch, a citizen of Rome and historian of Ancient
Greece, wrote Lives of Noble Grecians and Romans, a record of corrup-
tion in Ancient Greek politics.42  Plutarch wrote of Themistocles, a
prominent Athenian politician and general, that he was “eager in the
acquisition of riches”43 and of the Athenian democracy generally:
[T]he buying and selling of votes crept in and money became a feature of the
elections.  But afterwards, bribery affected even courts and camps, and con-
verted the city into a monarchy, by making armies the utter slaves of money.
For it has been well said that he first breaks down the power of the people who
first feasts and bribes them.44
Remarkably, freedom of speech and debate survived the centuries
of tumult, war, and oppression that marked the evolution of the west-
ern world.  In the early twentieth century, Justice Brandeis high-
lighted the democratic value of free speech in what is widely regarded
as among the “most important judicial opinions ever written on Amer-
ican freedom of speech”—his concurrence in Whitney v. California.45
For Justice Brandeis, as for the Athenian democrats, without free
speech “assembly discussion would be futile,” as its purpose is to aid
free citizens in political decision-making.46
Justice Brandeis also noted the role of free speech in the search for
truth in political debate.47  However, there is a longstanding debate in
American history as to whether free speech actually facilitates the
search for truth.  On one hand, John Milton and Thomas Jefferson
had faith that, in a free society with free speech, the truth would al-
41. Werhan, supra note 26, at 304; see S. SARA MONOSON, PLATO’S DEMOCRATIC EN-
TANGLEMENTS: ATHENIAN POLITICS AND THE PRACTICE OF PHILOSOPHY 59
(Princeton, 2000) (“the Athenians delighted in excellent oratory, for the most part
taking enormous pleasure in hearing competing views argued intensely and
beautifully . . . ”).
42. See PLUTARCH, LIVES OF NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS (A.H. Clough ed., John
Dryden Trans., 1979) available at http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/p/plutarch/lives/
chapter10.html; see also James H. Warner, The Triumph of Hope over Experience:
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and the First Amendment, 13 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, at n.1 (2003) (noting the “numerous accounts of cor-
ruption in ancient Greece and Rome”).
43. See PLUTARCH, supra note 42.
44. Plutarch, The Parallel Lives, in Loeb Classical Library ed. vol. IV (1916), availa-
ble at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Corio
lanus*.html.
45. Werhan, supra note 26, at 307; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372–80
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
46. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
47. Werhan, supra note 26, at 309.
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ways prevail and rise to the top of public discourse.48  John Stuart
Mill conversely asserted that although free speech may not lead to the
best decision, it would lead to collective action and perhaps the public
could come to rational rather than arbitrary decisions.49
In American democracy, the most direct descendant of the Athe-
nian public square’s function in promoting an idea-based discourse is
perhaps the political debate between candidates competing for electo-
ral office.  Many would argue that the Athenians could scarcely have
imagined a higher form of speech and assembly than what many claim
to be the high-water mark of American political discourse: the Lin-
coln–Douglas Debates.50  Taking place in 1858 during the Illinois Sen-
ate race, the Debates were a series of seven debates between the
incumbent, Democrat Stephen A. Douglas, and the challenger, Repub-
lican Abraham Lincoln.51  The overriding topic: slavery.52  Douglas
represented, for the sake of shorthand, a Dred Scott53 position and
Lincoln an abolitionist view.54  Yet despite the truly fundamental na-
ture of the scope of disagreement, these profoundly civilized, thought-
ful debates fostered collective and informed action on the part of the
people.55  Moreover, the discussions possessed many of the key attrib-
utes of the Athenian public square.
America’s political debates can be seen in the broader American
tradition of individuals, standing on equal footing, both actually and
metaphorically in the pursuit of the most meritorious ideas, however
imperfect.  The concept of promoting actual equality as opposed to
merely the freedom of formally equal opportunity can, in the more
modern political day, occasionally seem antiquated.  At the very least,
such notions of actual equality seem limited to the judicial branch,
and even there, the engravings above the courthouse entryways often
prove quixotic.56
48. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 51–52 (John W. Hales ed., Clarendon Press 1904)
(1644); Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, Jan 16, 1786, § I, in DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 125, 126 (Henry Steele Commager ed., Meredith Corp. 1968);
see Werhan, supra note 26, at 322.
49. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 5, 31
(Stefan Collini ed., 1989); see Werhan, supra note 26, at 322.
50. See, e.g., Michel Les Benedict, Lincoln and Constitutional Politics, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 1333, 1345–46 (2010).
51. Michael Taube, Obama and Romney Should Debate Lincoln–Douglas-Style,
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/3/
obama-and-romney-should-debate-lincoln-douglas-sty/#ixzz28GZOXqR8.
52. Id.
53. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
54. Id.
55. Les Benedict, supra note 50, at 1348–49.
56. The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.
supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (“Equal
Justice Under Law”).
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The Lincoln–Douglas debates can be seen as but one anecdotal il-
lustration of the American adaptation of the equality norms of the
Athenian square to a republican, rather than direct, form of democ-
racy.  Even within republicanism, evolving norms of political cam-
paigns and political processes, however, inevitably required more
creative and complex adaptations to serve similar norms.  Early theo-
retical arguments for campaign finance regulations, and especially
public financing, were one byproduct of that need to adapt, and in a
sense, to expand, the dialogue of ideas represented by the public
square.
A. Adapting the Public Square: The Three Key Theories
Many scholars consider the “original theoretical justification of
campaign finance regulation” to be the normative goal of “equalizing
influence,” “not as a guarantor of structured democratic deliberation
before the election, but as an effort to assure that certain powerful
groups do not exercise undue influence on its outcome.”57  This theory
traces John Rawls’s “fair value of political liberties,” which is defined
as a “guarantee of roughly equal influence for everyone over all stages
of the electoral process,” and which includes an equal opportunity for
anyone to hold public office.58  However, it is worth noting here that in
the modern era of political campaigns, and without public financing,
such inclusion is only rarely actual, as opposed to illusory.
Proponents of campaign regulation on equality grounds assert that
government intervention and regulation is required to equalize the fi-
nancial participation of all voters.  Equality proponents also seek to
bring access to all voters, rather than the system today that gives
greater access to wealthy donors.59  Under this theory, financial capi-
tal is a form of political capital, and in order to equalize political capi-
tal, by reducing the importance of fundraising as a way to generate
political power, some equalizing of financial capital via redistribution
promotes a kind of ex ante equality in the political arena60—the goal
being to ensure that subsequent political disparities or inequalities
will be the product of meritorious ideas and not superior financial
clout.61
57. Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign
Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 601 (2008) (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 601, 638.
59. Id. at 640, 643 (citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 328 (1993)).
60. See, e.g., Jamin Raskin & Jon Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practi-
cal Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160,
1203 (1994).
61. Id. (concluding “[t]he time has come to abolish the tyranny of private wealth in
the American political process”).
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A second significant strand of theory advanced in favor of cam-
paign finance regulation is, quite naturally, deliberative democracy,
which “ties legitimacy of self-rule to substantive and structural dis-
course about matters of public concern.”62  In response to what was
seen by scholars as the “deterioration of public discourse” in the coun-
try during the 1980s, legal scholars offered structured public “deliber-
ation” as a remedy.63
Based on Alexander Mieklejohn’s model of the traditional Ameri-
can town meeting, deliberative democrats argued in favor of fora in
which voters communicate their political observations and opinions in
a regulated setting.64  In addition to a base of public funding intended
to create an equalizing effect, the need for a structured public political
discourse justified limits on expenditures, thus making campaigns
less expensive and, most importantly, allowing for more diverse
viewpoints.65
Frank Pasquale is among those who have most clearly identified
the degree to which collective autonomy, a sub-theory of deliberative
democracy, assumes that democracy has the potential to empower citi-
zens.66  The collective autonomy theory envisions collective awareness
of self-determination.67  For collective autonomy to be guaranteed, the
state must intervene and structure access to a public forum.68  De-
spite the many theories advanced as a reason for equalization of politi-
cal influence, the Supreme Court has not accepted equalization as a
sufficient rationale to uphold campaign finance restrictions or pro-
grams in the face of the First Amendment
For reasons explored in Part II, however, the theoretical basis
upon which modern campaign regulation and financing overwhelm-
ingly rests is anticorruption.  Anticorruption theory takes as its pre-
mise the intuitive and historically verifiable realities that, in at least
some instances, campaign contributions, even where legal, function as
a kind of legalized bribery that constrains or animates political actors’
62. Pasquale, supra note 57, at 600.
63. Id. at 622; see also ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 2 (2004)
(identifying the basic problems of American republican democracy that delibera-
tion is supposed to “cure”).
64. Pasquale, supra note 57, at 624 (noting in this ideal setting, speakers stay on
topic and exhibit mutual respect).
65. Id. at 625.
66. Id. at 628.
67. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1407
(1986).
68. Pasquale, supra note 57, at 629; see also Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 60, at 1163
(“The purpose of campaign finance reform should be to fashion a system in which
electoral and governmental decision-making is based on the participation, delib-
eration, and interests of all citizens rather than on the awesome wealth of the
few.”). For a response to the fears of state influence in this area of the public
sphere, see Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787 (1987).
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judgment and actions.69  Accordingly, and even apart from the more
practical reason why advocates of campaign regulation emphasize an-
ticorruption—namely, that the first two theories are legally fore-
closed70—many commentators advocate measures to mitigate “the
importance of private money” in campaign finance precisely for this
reason.71  Anticorruption theory, and the anticorruption meme, is
thus the driving force behind the majority of campaign finance regula-
tion law in the United States today.72
One goal of public financing is to democratize, from a distributional
perspective, the responsiveness and representativeness of political
leaders.  The goal is to reduce the degree to which leaders prioritize
the relentless pursuit of contributions, even where those contributions
are entirely legal and ethical.  The relentless pursuit of contributions
creates, in the aggregate, a tragedy of the political commons.  Moreo-
ver, at least in theory, public financing mitigates the tendency of poli-
ticians to secure money in unethical and sometimes even illegal ways.
Support for public financing must overcome recent anecdotal ex-
amples ranging from Randy “Duke” Cunningham73 to Congressman
Jesse Jackson Jr.74 to former Connecticut Governor John Rowland,75
which “have cast a shadow of doubt in voters’ minds and have dis-
integrated the public trust in the democratic process” to the point that
many voters question whether politicians, so many of whom have
69. Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First
Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 6 (1997).
70. That is, equalization and deliberative democracy theories rely on systems of pub-
lic campaign financing.  But most modern American campaigns are made possi-
ble by private financing.  Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance
Reform: A Review of Voting with Dollars, 91 CAL. L. REV. 643, 645 (2003).  As
discussed infra, and as with any campaign finance regulation, for any public fi-
nancing system to prevail against the inevitable challenge it must satisfy the
anti-corruption purpose. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
71. E.g., ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF
FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 118 (1988).
72. See infra Part I.B.
73. Representative Cunningham pleaded guilty to taking bribes totaling over $2.4
million while a he was a member of the House of Representatives.  Bill Chappell,
Former Rep. ‘Duke’ Cunningham Freed After Bribery Sentence, NPR (June 4,
2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/06/04/188667106/former-rep-
duke-cunningham-freed-after-bribery-sentence.
74. Representative Jackson pleaded guilty to spending $75,000 in campaign funds to
buy personal items. Gov’t Recommends 4 Years in Prison for Jesse Jackson Jr.,
CBS NEWS (June 7, 2013) http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588331/govt-
recommends-4-years-in-prison-for-jesse-jackson-jr/.
75. Rowland resigned as Governor and later pleaded guilty to conspiracy to steal
honest service because he accepted more than $100,000 worth of personal gifts in
exchange for government contracts. Matt Apuzzo & John Christofferson, Former
Gov. Rowland Gets a Year in Prison for Graft, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2005), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-03-18-rowland_x.htm?POE=NEW
ISVA.
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proven to be untrustworthy and selfish, are deserving of their tax dol-
lars.76  It is rational to query why voters would or should support and
participate in what has been deemed “a welfare program for
politicians.”77
Supporters of public financing maintain that the system is crucial
for the health of our democracy and that, despite these few bad ap-
ples,78 the system has worked to some degree or has the potential to if
structured and implemented correctly.  Public funds have paved the
way for many politicians who lack the resources to run in competitive
races.79  This phenomenon has “foster[ed] diversity in the electoral
process” and enabled those from historically underrepresented groups
to hold office.80  Public funds have also enabled politicians to focus
more on the interests of a broader cross section of the population, in-
cluding groups such as the retired elderly couple and high school
teachers, rather than focusing primarily on those of the hedge fund
manager who spent millions supporting their campaign.81  The shift-
ing of attention from the elite and wealthy supporters to the everyday
constituent will, in theory, foster and redevelop voter engagement
that has eroded over the years, at least in part because of the influ-
ence of money in elections.82
One consequence that follows in part from the emphasis on an-
ticorruption theory is a derivative emphasis on the nos of campaign
regulations—most notably contribution limits—as opposed to affirma-
tive steps such as public financing, which not only serves the anticor-
ruption interest but more significantly fosters the equalization and
deliberative democracy norms.83  Public financing serves interests
76. J. Mijin Cha & Miles Rappaport, Fresh Start: The Impact of Public Campaign
Financing in Connecticut, DEMOS 4 (Apr 2013) http://www.demos.org/sites/de-
fault/files/publications/FreshStart_PublicFinancingCT_0.pdf.
77. Huma Khan, Public Financing for Presidential Campaigns on Chopping Block,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/public-financing-presi-
dential-campaigns-chopping-block/story?id=12778579 (quoting Senate Minority
Leader Mitch McConnell).
78. It is worth noting that none of the aforementioned scandals involved publicly
funded candidates.
79. Cha & Rappaport, supra note 76, at 11.
80. Mimi Marziani, Laura Moy, Adam Skaggs & Marcus Williams, More Than Com-
bating Corruption: The Other Benefits of Public Financing, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/more-combating-
corruption-other-benefits-public-financing; STEVEN M. LEVIN, KEEPING IT CLEAN:
PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 3 (Jan. 2006), available at http://poli-
cyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/4523.pdf.
81. Cha & Rappaport supra note 76, at 6–8.
82. See LEVIN, supra note 80, at xi.
83. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 60, at 1176 (linking “[t]he ability to raise large
quantities of money” with incumbency); id. at 1183 (arguing that “the accumula-
tion of huge private war chests by incumbent officials pervasively discourages
political competition and, as a result, stifles debate”); Emma Greenman,
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that go beyond the anticorruption rationale that contribution limits
seek to address.  Public financing is an affirmative, rather than just a
restrictive, system that seeks to prevent corruption, encourage diver-
sity among candidates, and promote service to the public as a whole
rather than donors.
B. The Development of Campaign Finance Reform in the
United States
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the promul-
gation of a number of campaign finance laws.  In the 1890s, four
states, Nebraska, Missouri, Florida, and Tennessee, passed laws
prohibiting corporate contributions.84  These early state laws, enacted
in response to the corporate contributions supporting William McKin-
ley’s presidential campaign, helped shape the federal campaign fi-
nance laws that followed only a few years later.85
The first round of federal campaign finance laws was significantly
motivated by a concern that corporations were too involved in govern-
ment.86  This first attempt at regulating money in politics was driven
by the fear of aggregated money, through the corporate form, being
used to unduly influence politicians and the government.  In 1907, the
Tillman Act banned campaign contributions and spending by federally
chartered banks and corporations.87  In 1910, the first of the two Fed-
eral Corrupt Practices Acts required disclosures for certain Senate
and House races.88  In 1925, following on the heels of the Teapot Dome
scandal,89 Congress enacted the second Federal Corrupt Practices Act.
This Act extended the Tillman Act’s reach well beyond federally
chartered banks and corporations by banning all corporate contribu-
Strengthening the Hand of Voters in the Marketplace of Ideas: Roadmap to Cam-
paign Finance Reform in a Post-Wisconsin Right to Life Era, 24 J.L. & POL. 209,
209 (2008) (identifying the fear that “organized money in politics” and “[outside]
groups are neither representative nor transparent and they exert influence in the
political arena that interferes with the core [value] of . . . democratic
deliberation”).
84. Pasquale, supra note 57, at 604–05.
85. See Smith, supra note 69, at 20.
86. William Jennings Bryan set up the following dichotomy: “On the one side
stand[s] the corporate interests of the nation . . . . On the other side stands [the]
unnumbered throng . . . . Work-worn and dust-begrimed . . . .” JAMES L. SUND-
QUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND REALIGNMENT OF POLITI-
CAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 137–38 (1983). Senator Ben Tillman believed
federal legislators were “instrumentalities and agents of corporations.” Smith,
supra note 69, at 21.
87. Smith, supra note 69, at 21.
88. Id.
89. See MUTCH, supra note 71, at 24.
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tions.90  The Hatch Act of 1939, also enacted in response to charges of
corruption in the highest office (this time in the Roosevelt administra-
tion), set broad prohibitions of certain political activities of federal em-
ployees.91 Congress expanded the Hatch Act’s reach only one year
later by banning donations by federal contractors and employees of
federally funded state agencies.92  The last major round of campaign
finance reform prior to the enactment of the Federal Elections Cam-
paign Act of 1971 targeted labor unions’ influence in politics.  The
1943 Smith-Connally Act and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 prohibited
campaign contributions from labor union organizations.93
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 197194 (FECA) was Con-
gress’s first attempt at imposing campaign spending limits and requir-
ing campaign financing disclosure.95  However, initially, the Act did
not establish contribution limits or overall spending limits.96  Rather,
under four titles, FECA regulated campaign media advertising, lim-
ited a candidate’s use of personal funds, required reports of contribu-
tions and expenditures to be filed with Congress, and repealed the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.97
FECA was amended in 1974 in the wake of the 1972 election in an
attempt to close the loopholes exposed in the Watergate scandal.98
Congress attempted to further regulate campaign spending, activity,
and contributions through the amendment.99  The new legislation
sought to stop the abuses of the prior election and of the Nixon admin-
istration through comprehensive regulation of the campaign finance
system.100  Most notably, the 1974 amendments created the Federal
90. Smith, supra note 69, at 21–22.  Direct contributions from corporations to candi-
dates for federal office are still prohibited. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (permitting indepen-
dent expenditure but passing on the question of direct expenditure).
91. Pasquale, supra note 57, at 608.
92. Smith, supra note 69, at 22.
93. Pasquale, supra note 57, at 608. Though the Citizens United decision found inde-
pendent expenditures permissible, direct contributions from labor unions, like di-
rect contributions from corporations, to independent groups are still prohibited.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913; 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012).  For a discussion on the
clean election bills passed between Taft-Hartley and the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act, see HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS,
AND POLITICAL REFORM 26-28 (2d ed. 1980).
94. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
95. See Ifshin & Warin, supra note 23, at 490.
96. Id. at 491; see Federal Election Campaign Act, supra note 94.
97. Ifshin & Warin, supra note 23, at 490–91; Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971.
98. See Ifshin & Warin, supra note 23, at 492.
99. Id.
100. Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 102 (1994)
(discussing how the legislative history of the 1974 amendments shows that Con-
gress intended to limit executive influence by affording the FEC jurisdiction to
regulate presidential campaigns).
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Election Commission (FEC).101  The FEC was designed to be the fed-
eral elections regulatory agency.102  In this capacity, the FEC could
investigate, issue advisory opinions, promulgate regulations enacting
FECA, and even bring suit against anyone who violated the laws.103
The amendments also created a public financing option for the presi-
dential race, including a matching fund and lump sum system for
presidential candidates.104
Almost immediately after the 1974 amendments, the constitution-
ality of FECA was challenged in Buckley v. Valeo.105  In Buckley, the
Supreme Court, per curiam, struck down several key provisions of
FECA as unconstitutional, including the manner in which the FEC
commissioners were appointed,106 restrictions on campaign spend-
ing,107 and the restrictions on the use of candidates’ personal
funds.108
Regarding the restrictions on campaign spending, the Court struck
down the $1,000 ceiling on independent expenditures,109 the overall
campaign spending ceilings, and the limits on a candidate’s use of per-
sonal funds.110  With regard to fundraising, the Court upheld the
101. See Ifshin & Warin, supra note 23, at 492.
102. Id. at 494.
103. Id.; see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)(C) (Supp. III 1979) (granting authority to refer
violations of FECA to the attorney general)
104. I.R.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1976); see Ifshin & Warin, supra note 23, at 492–94.
105. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8 (1976) (per curiam).
106. Id. at 109-43.  Under the 1974 amendments, there were to be six FEC commis-
sioners.  Ifshin & Warin, supra note 23, at 494.  The President, the President of
the Senate, and the Speaker of the House would each select two commissioners,
one from each party, so there would be an equal number of Democrat and Repub-
lican members. Id.  Each selection would be subject to Senate confirmation, and
the commissioners would be appointed for staggered six-year terms. Id.  The
Buckley Court found that appointment of executive branch officials by members
of Congress presented serious separation of powers issues and violated the ap-
pointments clause of Article II of the Constitution.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 109–43;
Ifshin & Warin, supra note 23, at 494–95.
107. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54–59. FECA restricted the amount a candidate for Presi-
dent, the Senate, or the House could spend in both the primary and general elec-
tion. Id. at 54–55.  The Court rejected a number of rationales for spending limits,
including slowing the growth in campaign costs, equalization of candidates’ re-
sources, and preventing corruption. Id. at 54–59.
108. Id. at 51–54.  The Court again rejected the equalization-of-resources rationale
because the restriction abridged First Amendment rights and did not serve to
prevent corruption. Id. at 54.
109. Id. at 51.  The Court did uphold the limits on independent expenditures that “ex-
pressly advocate” for the election or defeat of a candidate. Id. at 80.  The Court
listed the so-called magic words that qualify as express advocacy, which include
“vote for, elect, support, cast your ballot for, Smith for Congress, vote against,
defeat, [and] reject.” Id. at 44 n.52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. at 51-54; see Ifshin & Warin, supra note 23, at 495.
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$1,000 limit on contributions to candidates.111  As Part II explores
more fully, the Court also upheld Congress’s conditioning the receipt
of public campaign funds on similar campaign spending and fundrais-
ing restrictions as a valid method to force candidates into said spend-
ing limits.112
Buckley largely scuttled Congress’s efforts to avoid Watergate,
Part II, causing Congress to scale back some of its initial regulations
in 1979.113  Congress, among other things, raised the threshold that
triggers reporting requirements, and removed spending limits on local
parties for materials associated with volunteer activities.114  In Buck-
ley’s wake, the vast majority of the action in the campaign regulation
arena continued to revolve around limits and prohibitions as opposed
to facilitation.
In keeping with Buckley, the Supreme Court continued the tradi-
tion of striking down limits on campaign spending while upholding
government regulation of campaign contributions.115  In 1996, the
Court in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Fed-
eral Election Commission, struck down a FECA provision that prohib-
ited political party expenditures in elections, holding that political
parties may spend an unlimited amount on elections as long as the
expenditures are uncoordinated with a candidate’s campaign.116  In
2000, the Court revisited Buckley in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govern-
ment PAC117 and affirmed the constitutionality of limiting campaign
contributions.118
111. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28–29 (holding that the compelling government interest in
preventing both actual and apparent corruption was sufficient to uphold the
$1,000 contribution limit).
112. Id. at 94-96.
113. Ifshin & Warin, supra note 23, at 497 (discussing the main purpose of the 1979
amendments—to reduce and simplify the reporting requirements and encourage
more volunteering in campaigns).
114. 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (Supp. III 1979).  The original trigger requirement for disclo-
sure was set at just $10. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 62.  For any contribution greater
than $10, the name and address of the donor must be reported, and for any per-
son who contributes $100, his or her employer and occupation must be reported.
Id. at 63.  The reporting threshold was raised to $200 by the 1979 amendment,
where it still remains today.  2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (Supp. III 1979).
115. See Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning
of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1735 (2001).
116. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604,
619 (1996).
117. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386–97 (2000).
118. Id. at 386–97 (upholding the contribution limits as a means to prevent corruption
and because the limits were not so restrictive as to prevent the campaign from
raising the necessary funds for “effective advocacy”).
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Congress responded to the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence
with the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),119 more
commonly known as the McCain-Feingold law.120  BCRA again fo-
cused on limits and prohibitions and was enacted to prohibit the use of
corporate general treasury funds in federal elections (by prohibiting
corporate spending on campaign advertisements) and to revisit regu-
lation of political party campaign spending (by prohibiting party com-
mittees from raising or spending soft money).121  The main purpose of
BCRA was to address the combined use of soft money and issue adver-
tisements that were being used to circumvent contribution limits.122
Shortly thereafter, in McConnell v. Federal Election Commis-
sion,123 the Court upheld the majority of BCRA’s prohibitions, includ-
ing the prohibition of most corporate-funded “electioneering
communications”124 within blackout periods immediately preceding
elections.125  The blackout period applied to any corporate-funded
electioneering communication that was aired within thirty days of a
primary or sixty days of a general election.126  The Court abruptly re-
versed course in 2007, less than five years later, when it found that
the BCRA blackout periods violated corporate free speech in Federal
Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.127  Under Wis-
consin Right to Life, only express advocacy for the victory or defeat of a
political candidate could be regulated, and “issue ads”—so called be-
cause they only reference a particular candidate in association with a
particular issue—could not be regulated as “electioneering
communications.”128
119. See Michelle D. Clark, Unleashing Electioneering: Analyzing the Court’s Decision
in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652
(2007), 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 121, 125–26 (2008); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
120. Robert Bauer, The McCain-Feingold Coordination Rules: The Ongoing Program
to Keep Politics Under Control, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 508 (2005).
121. See Clark, supra note 119, at 126.
122. See Craig Holman & Joan Claybrook, Outside Groups in the Campaign Finance
Environment: The Meaning of BCRA and the McConnell Decision, 22 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 235, 243 (2004).
123. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
124. An “electioneering communication” is an advertisement that refers to a clearly
identifiable candidate for federal office and is run in that candidate’s electoral
jurisdiction.  2 U.S.C § 434(f)(3) (2012); see Michael S. Kang, The End of Cam-
paign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2012).
125. McConnell, 540 U.S at 205–06; Clark, supra note 119, at 127.
126. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
127. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 460 (2007) (identi-
fying the advertisements in question as within the electioneering communication
blackout period); id. at 476–77 (holding that the advertisements in question were
not express advocacy and thus cannot be restricted).
128. Id. at 446–48.
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The other shoe dropped in 2010 in the more widely known Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission129 when the Court, essentially
reversing its decision in McConnell,130 found limits on independent
corporate expenditures unconstitutional.131  The Court has continued
to remain true to the essential elements of Buckley: restrictions on
political expenditures violate the First Amendment while restrictions
on contributions are justified as a means of preventing corruption.132
Notably, however, for all of the complexities and machinations repre-
sented by the cursory references to the above decisions, over the
course of decades, the Court basically left the public financing aspects
of campaign regulation undisturbed.  The solicitude would not prove
eternal.
III. PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICA: DREAMS
MEET CONSTRAINTS
FECA’s prohibitions and limits and the various state and federal
analogs that followed have had mixed success in the courts and even
more mixed success in the public sphere.  In contrast, initially at least,
the presidential public financing system was a highly successful facili-
tation of the nation’s highest “public square.”
A. FECA Public Financing: Teddy Roosevelt’s Idea Sixty
Years Later
In his 1907 State of the Union Address, President Theodore
Roosevelt called upon Congress to enact legislation to curb corruption
and increase transparency in campaign financing.133  President
Roosevelt noted that in order to “hamper an unscrupulous man of un-
limited means from buying his way into office,” Congress ought to
“provid[e] an appropriation for the proper and legitimate expenses of
129. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
130. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.
131. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. See also id. at 910 (recognizing that “indepen-
dent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo cor-
ruption”).  The Court rejected an opportunity to revisit Citizens United in 2012
when it issued a summary reversal of a Montana statute prohibiting independent
expenditures by corporations.  American Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S.
Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).
132. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976) (per curiam); J. Robert Abraham, Sav-
ing Buckley: Creating a Stable Campaign Finance Framework, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1078, 1084 (2010).  However, restrictions on contributions to expenditure-
only groups, which would come to be known as super PACs, are not allowed and
violate the First Amendment.  Speechnow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d
686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010); James A. Kahl, Citizens United, Super PACs, and Cor-
porate Spending on Political Campaigns: How Did We Get Here and Where Are
We Going?, 59 FED. LAW. 40, 42 (2012).
133. President Theodore Roosevelt, Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1907) (tran-
script available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29548).
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each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to
meet the necessity for thorough organization and machinery, which
requires a large expenditure of money.”134  Roughly sixty years later,
President Roosevelt’s campaign financing proposal was finally
brought to life in the form of the 1971 Revenue Act and FECA.135
The 1971 Revenue Act laid the foundation for today’s public cam-
paign financing system. The Act set up the Presidential Election Cam-
paign Fund (the Fund) and established a voluntary checkoff on federal
tax returns to be used to finance the Fund—$1 for individual returns
and $2 for joint returns.136  Although President Nixon staunchly op-
posed the portion of the Act dealing with campaign financing, Con-
gress declined his request for “reconsideration” and reinforced the
campaign financing provisions through the enactment of FECA and
its subsequent amendments.137
FECA and its amendments were considered “the most comprehen-
sive reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress concerning the elec-
tion of the President, Vice-President, and members of Congress.”138
The relevant public campaign finance provisions included the initia-
tion of Fund payments to finance presidential nominating conven-
tions; the creation of the Presidential Primary Matching Payment
Account, which matched donations up to $250 made by individuals to
candidates in the primaries; and the establishment of a general elec-
tion spending limit of $20 million plus cost-of-living allowance.
As discussed in Section I, the constitutionality of FECA’s provi-
sions was immediately challenged in Buckley v. Valeo.139  With regard
to the public finance provisions, the Court upheld the Fund on three
grounds: (1) the General Welfare Clause, (2) the First Amendment,
and (3) the Equal Protection Clause.140  Congress satisfied the Gen-
eral Welfare Clause requirement because the purpose of the Act was
to “reduce the deleterious influence of large contributions on our polit-
ical process, to facilitate communication by candidates with the electo-
134. Id.
135. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972);
Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-178, 85 Stat. 573 (1971).
136. Revenue Act of 1971; JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32786, THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN FUND AND TAX CHECKOFF: BACKGROUND AND
CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2005).  The checkoff has since been raised to $3 for individual
filers and $6 for joint filers. The FEC and Federal Campaign Finance Law, FED-
ERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (updated Jan. 2013), http://www.fec.gov/pages/
brochures/fecfeca.shtml.
137. Statement About the Revenue Act of 1971, PUB. PAPERS; RICHARD NIXON, 1971,
1181–82 (Dec. 10, 1971), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=3255.
138. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519
F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
139. Id. at 6.
140. Id. at 91–96.
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 70 Side B      12/12/2013   14:12:17
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 70 Side B      12/12/2013   14:12:17
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-2\NEB205.txt unknown Seq: 22 12-DEC-13 14:07
370 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:349
rate, and to free candidates from the rigors of fundraising.”141  First
Amendment standards were satisfied because rather than limiting or
restricting speech the public financing system functioned to “facilitate
and enlarge” speech.142
The challenges to the Act in Buckley by Senators McCarthy and
Buckley were premised on a conviction that the Act was not an at-
tempt at reform in reaction to Watergate but an attempt to entrench
incumbents and “freeze out the voices of change.”143  The Court re-
jected this argument under the Equal Protection Clause because the
public funding system was not discriminatory and provided the oppor-
tunity to use the system for any candidate that qualified.144  The chal-
lengers believed that the government should not be in the business of
funding elections, which are designed to be a check on government.145
They believed that, like the separation of church and state, the sepa-
ration of government funding from the political process is required to
avoid “dangerous ‘entanglement.’”146  The Court rejected this argu-
ment and held that the Act did not violate the First Amendment.147
Congressional intent had been to broaden public participation and in-
crease speech in the presidential election process.148  The Court rea-
soned that the Act “furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment
values.”149
In contrast, Senator McCarthy famously compared public cam-
paign finance to the King of England financing the American Revolu-
tion by asking people to imagine King George III saying to the
141. Id. at 91.
142. Id. at 92–93.
143. Joel M. Gora, Don’t Feed the Alligators: Government Funding of Political Speech
and the Unyielding Vigilance of the First Amendment, 2010–2011 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 81, 88 (2011).
144. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93–94 (distinguishing the public financing system from bal-
lot access cases).
145. Gora, supra note 143, at 91.
146. Id.
147. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92–93 (holding that the analogy to separation of church and
state inapplicable because public financing is Congress’s attempt to use public
funding to “facilitate and enlarge” speech); J. Robert Abraham, Note, Saving
Buckley: Creating a Stable Campaign Finance Framework, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1078, 1081-83 (2010).
148. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92–93; see also Stephanie Pestorich Manson, Note, When
Money Talks: Reconciling Buckley, the First Amendment, and Campaign Finance
Reform, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1109, 1121 (2001) (“In defending the limitation,
the government also urged that an interest in equalizing the ability of various
groups and individuals to influence campaigns warranted the expenditure re-
strictions.”) (footnote omitted).
149. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92–93; see also Matthew A. Melone, Citizens United and
Corporate Political Speech: Did the Supreme Court Enhance Political Discourse or
Invite Corruption?, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 29, 43 (2010) (discussing the Court’s recog-
nition of “the strong link between money and the ability to amplify and effectively
disseminate political messages to the electorate.”) (footnote omitted).
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Colonists: “ ‘Why don’t you raise a few thousand pounds?  We will pro-
vide matching funds, and you can run a pure revolution with match-
ing funds from the Crown.  We will have a few things to say about how
you run the revolution and where it goes . . . .’ ”150  Opponents of cam-
paign finance regulation feel that any restriction is both a burden on
free speech and that the government should not be involved in electing
politicians.  They see the government as meddling in the people’s job
of choosing their elected officials.  Apt analogy to King George?  Not
exactly.  But it encompasses the ideological divide between those for
and those against public campaign finance.
B. The Presidential System in Operation
1. Primaries
The FECA public financing system is voluntary.151  Public funding
for the primaries comes in the form of matching funds.152  Candidates
running for a party’s nomination can qualify for matching funds by
raising $5,000 in twenty different states.153  Once the FEC deter-
mines that a candidate qualifies, the candidate can submit evidence of
contributions for the distribution of matching funds.154 Only contribu-
tions from individuals are matched, and although a candidate can re-
ceive contributions up to $2,600 from individual donors, only the first
$250 of each donation is matched.155  By accepting public primary
funds, candidates agree to abide by an overall national spending limit,
as well as spending limits in each state.156  In 2012, the applicable
overall national spending limit for the primaries was $54,744,840.157
The Buckley Court commented specifically on the matching
formula for the primary elections, noting that the requirement that a
candidate solicit a minimum number of small donations promotes a
diverse voter base.158  Moreover, “[t]he thrust of the legislation is to
reduce financial barriers and to enhance the importance of smaller
contributions.”159  Of particular note to some commentators is how the
150. Mary Meehan, The Federal Election Commission, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS No.-
2 (Nov. 1, 1980), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-00c.pdf.
151. Presidential Election Campaign Fund, FED. ELECTION COMMMISSION, http://www.
fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.shtml (last visited June 25, 2013) [hereinafter Cam-
paign Fund].
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.; Contribution Limits 2013–14, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.
gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml (last visited June 25, 2013).
156. Campaign Fund, supra note 151.
157. Id. This value is tied to inflation and has increased from its original limit of $10
million set in 1976. Id.
158. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 106 (1976) (per curiam).
159. Id. at 107 (footnotes omitted).
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Court struck down personal spending limits on candidates but upheld
those spending limits when attached as a condition of receipt of public
funds.160  The Court justified the disparity in a small footnote in the
Buckley opinion:
For the reasons discussed in Part III, infra, Congress may engage in public
financing of election campaigns and may condition acceptance of public funds
on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure limita-
tions.  Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contributions
he chose to accept, he may decide to forgo private fundraising and accept pub-
lic funding.161
The footnote effectively sanctioned the receipt of a government
benefit—public campaign funds—conditioned on the candidate’s vol-
untary acceptance of the commensurate limits that were imposed as
part of the overall scheme.162
2. General Election
The nominee of each major party is eligible for a grant of public
money for the general election.163  In order to receive the grant, candi-
dates agree to refrain from accepting private contributions for the re-
mainder of the campaign.164  Although both nominees opted out of the
program, the grant for 2012 was approximately $91,241,400.165  Prior
to 2008, when then-Senator Barack Obama opted out of the system,
every major party presidential candidate had accepted the public
grant for the general election.166
C. Declining Viability of the Presidential Campaign
Financing System
In 2011, the House of Representatives voted on various occasions
to abolish public financing for presidential elections.167  The bills, in-
troduced by Representative Tom Cole (R-Okla.) in January and by
160. Id. at 92–93 (upholding the public financing spending restrictions and saying
that public financing “furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values”
after striking down limits on privately financed campaigns).
161. Id. at 57 n.65.
162. Id.
163. Campaign Fund, supra note 151.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Glenn Hudson, Note, Think Small: The Future of Public Financing After Arizona
Free Enterprise, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 413, 426 (2012).
167. Pete Kasperowicz, House Votes to End Publicly Funded Presidential Campaigns,
THE HILL (Jan. 26, 2011, 3:07 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/
140459-house-votes-to-end-publicly-financed-presidential-campaigns; Ben Per-
shing, House Votes to End Public Funding for Presidential Campaigns, Post in
2chambers, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2011, 3:13 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/2chambers/post/house-votes-to-end-public-funding-for-presidential-cam
paigns/2011/12/01/gIQAc8SaHO_blog.html.
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Representative Gregg Harper (R-Miss.) in November, sought to elimi-
nate the Fund and the Primary Matching Account and to use the $200
million contained in those accounts to reduce the deficit.168  In a press
release following the House of Representatives passage of the bill,
Rep. Harper stated that “[s]ince 1976, taxpayers have spent 1.5 billion
dollars subsidizing a campaign finance program that hasn’t
worked.”169  Rep. Cole called the elimination of the program a “no
brainer.”170
Shortly after the House passed the bill in January of 2011, Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) introduced the bill into the
Senate.  Sen. McConnell called the presidential campaign system “an
outdated, wasteful Washington program” and deemed it “welfare for
politicians.”171  In opposition to the bill, Senator Charles Schumer (D-
N.Y.) claimed that the Republicans were attempting to “finish the job
that the Supreme Court started with the Citizens United decision.”172
Sen. Schumer went on to note that elimination of the program “would
bust one of the last dams protecting our election system from an un-
controlled flood of special-interest money.”173 Although the bill was
introduced in the Senate, it was never brought to the floor, ultimately
leaving the future of the fund in limbo.174
So what exactly has happened to the system?  How could a system
that, prior to 2012, had been used by all presidential candidates, ex-
cept Barack Obama in 2008, be on the chopping block?  Commentators
have attributed the decline of the viability of presidential public cam-
paign finance to three main issues: (1) problems with the voluntary
checkoff, (2) shortfalls in the Presidential Election Campaign Fund,
and (3) the ever-changing demands of the campaign process.
168. H.R. 359, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 3463, 112th Cong. (2011).
169. House Moves Bill to End Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns, CONGRESS-
MAN GREGG HARPER (Dec. 1, 2011), http://harper.house.gov/press-release/house-
moves-bill-end-public-financing-presidential-campaigns-eac.
170. Kasperowicz, supra note 167.
171. Huma Khan, Public Financing for Presidential Campaigns on Chopping Block,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/public-financing-presi-
dential-campaigns-chopping-block/story?id=12778579#.UG9oLsRYtmo.  Senator
McConnell has long been an opponent of campaign finance and is the named
plaintiff in McConnell v. FEC.  Gerard J. Clark & Steven B. Lichtman, The Fin-
ger in the Dike: Campaign Finance Regulation After McConnell, 39 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 629, 640 (2006).
172. Jonathan D. Salant, U.S. House Votes to End Campaign Finance System, Senate
Unlikely to Agree, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-01-27/u-s-house-votes-to-end-campaign-finance-system-senate-
unlikely-to-agree.html.
173. Id.
174. See Ben Pershing, As White House Candidates Abandon Public Funding, Repub-
licans Look to End System, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.washington
post.com/politics/as-white-house-candidates-abandon-public-funding-republicans
-look-to-end-system/2011/11/28/gIQA5doM6N_story.html.
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1. Checkoff Lag and Misconceptions
The voluntary checkoff program is a vital aspect of the presidential
campaign financing system for the simple reason that the checkoff is
its sole source of funding.  First appearing in 1972 tax returns, the
checkoff enables a taxpayer to set aside either $3 (if filing individu-
ally) or $6 (if filing jointly) to the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund.175  Initially successful, participation in this program (i.e. tax-
payers who check “yes” on their tax return) has steadily declined over
the past thirty years.176  This decline has partially been attributed to
a misunderstanding among taxpayers about the program.177  There is
a common misconception among taxpayers that by checking off “yes”
on their tax return, they are increasing their tax liability.178  This is
simply not true.179
When a taxpayer checks off “yes,” the government sets aside $3 (or
$6) for the Presidential Campaign Election Fund.180  In other words,
checking off “yes” does not increase a person’s tax bill, but rather, it
signals to the government that it needs to direct $3 (or $6) to the cam-
paign fund.  The FEC tried to dispel this misconception through an
education program in 1991 and 1992.181  The education program in-
cluded, inter alia, television and radio announcements urging taxpay-
ers to make an “informed choice” when deciding whether or not to
check off “yes,” brochures explaining the program, distribution of in-
formation to accountants and tax preparation services, and various
announcements in magazines and newspapers.182  Although the FEC
claims that the program reached a potential audience of 206 million
people, voter participation continued to decline.183
In addition to the checkoff misconception, the checkoff has been
hindered by what Representative Moakley (D-Mass.) deemed a “cleri-
175. JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32786, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELEC-
TION CAMPAIGN FUND AND TAX CHECKOFF: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT ISSUES 2–3
(2005) available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/105185.pdf; Fed.
Election Comm’n, The $3 Checkoff, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION (published Dec.
1993), http://www.fec.gov/info/checkoff.htm (last visited June 27, 2012).
176. Checkoff participation peaked at 28.7% in 1980. Press Release, Presidential Fund
Income Tax Check-Off Status, 1992-2012, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION (Sept.
2012), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/pres_cf/PresidentialFund-
Status_September2012.pdf [hereinafter Press Release].  In 2012, only 5.1% par-
ticipated. Id.
177. CANTOR, supra note 175.
178. Id.
179. Press Release, supra note 176.
180. Id.
181. Funding the Program: The $1 Tax Checkoff, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.
fec.gov/info/chfive.htm (last visited June 27, 2013) [hereinafter Funding].
182. Id.
183. Press Release, supra note 176.
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cal problem” in 1989.184  Testifying before the House of Representa-
tives, Rep. Moakley expressed concern that the use of tax preparation
services has contributed to the decline in checkoff participation.  He
noted, “. . . it is common practice in the [accounting] industry to leave
the [checkoff] blank and begin the preparation procedure one space
down.”185  Rep. Moakley further commented that “since leaving the
item blank is the same as checking ‘no,’ these preparers are making a
negative choice, on behalf of their clients, without affording them an
opportunity to make an informed judgment.”186  Rep. Moakley at-
tempted to introduce a bill that would make the checkoff automatic,
“unless the taxpayer specifically designates that he does not want
money to be paid into the fund.”187  The bill never made it out of the
subcommittee, leaving “no” as the checkoff default.188
Ultimately, whether it is the misunderstanding about the checkoff
or the “clerical problem” cited by Rep. Moakley, participation in the
program is at an all-time low.  As noted by FEC Commissioner
Michael Toner,
[a]ny system of public financing must have popular support to succeed. To-
day’s low taxpayer checkoff rates cast serious doubt on whether the public
financing system has this support . . . When only one in nine taxpayers are
[sic] participating, it is very difficult to conclude that the public financing sys-
tem has broad popular support.189
2. Funding Shortfalls
Over the past decade, the public campaign financing system has
been plagued by chronic shortfalls.190  The FEC had to delay pay-
ments to candidates in 1996 and 2000, and it narrowly scraped by in
2004 (thanks to George W. Bush and John Kerry opting out in the
primaries) and 2008 (thanks largely to Obama opting out in the gen-
eral election).191  The FEC attributes the shortfalls to what it deems a
“fatal flaw” in FECA—payments from the funds are indexed for infla-
tion, but the tax checkoff is not.192  As a result, disbursements are
184. 135 Cong. Rec. H913 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Moakley).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. H.R. 1671, 101st Cong. (1989); Bill Summary & Status H.R. 1671, LIBR. OF
CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d101:h.r.01671 (last visited June
28, 2013).
189. John Samples, The Failures of Taxpayer Financing of Presidential Campaigns,
CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS No. 500, at 13 (Nov. 25, 2003), available at http://
www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/failures-taxpayer-financing-presiden-
tial-campaigns.
190. Fixing the Voluntary Tax Checkoff Program to Fund Presidential Elections, PUB.
CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/congress/article_redirect.cfm?ID=10642 (last vis-
ited June 28, 2013).
191. Id.
192. Funding, supra note 181.
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consistently increasing, while revenue remains fixed.  The shortfall
problem generated by this fundamental flaw is exacerbated by the de-
creasing checkoff participation and the ever-increasing financial de-
mands of campaigns. Even apart from the campaign demands
discussed below, the lack of money flowing into the Fund is so pro-
nounced that, in some respects, the Fund’s existence has been “saved”
only by the fact that candidates now routinely choose not to partici-
pate.193  Effectively, it is a moribund circle spelling the demise of pres-
idential public financing as the nation once knew it.
3. Campaign Demands
The presidential campaign financing system in place today has re-
mained largely untouched since its inception in 1974.194  While, in
some cases, such permanent legislation may be an indication of sound
policy, the fact that the system has not been updated has proven fatal.
Today’s campaign process is dramatically different than it was in
1974.  The most notable difference is the sheer amount of money being
pumped into and out of the campaigns.  In 2000, then-Governor
George W. Bush opted out of the program and raised a record $100
million in the Republican primary—twice the amount offered to candi-
dates who opted for public funds.195 Moreover, as of December 31,
2012, Mitt Romney and Barack Obama raised $447.6 million and
$722.4 million respectively.196  In fact, President Obama reportedly
shattered campaign contribution records by raising more than $150
193. Both President Obama and Mitt Romney opted not to take part in the public
financing system in the 2012 election.  Catalina Camia, Obama, Romney Skip
Taxpayer Money for Campaign, USA TODAY ON POL. (Apr. 27, 2012, 2:03 PM),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/2012/04/mitt-romney-
public-financing-presidential-campaign-/1#.URcM5aU0WSo.
194. The only significant change came in 2002 when Congress passed the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act, which banned the use of “soft money” in campaigns and
restricted the use of general treasury funds by corporations and unions for “elec-
tioneering communication.”  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No.
107–155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).  As previously noted, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
the “electioneering communications” restriction unconstitutional in Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).
195. Fred Wertheimer, Op-Ed., Just Whose Presidency is This?, WASH. POST (Jan. 15,
2003), available at www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7BFD7
14569-5FB3-45D6-82D4-A3098EE124BA%7D&DE=%7BECA4CE0D-E59D-49
4B-9622-586F65F50529%7D.
196. 2012 Presidential Campaign Finance, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.
fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do (last visited June 28, 2013).  These totals are de-
rived from reports submitted by the campaigns to the FEC and do not include the
contributions collected, and ultimately spent, by the Super PACs supporting the
candidates. See id.
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million in September 2012 alone.197  If the presidential nominees
opted for public funds, they would each have been tied down by a
spending limit of approximately $91 million.198  The numbers ulti-
mately do not match up.  As noted by Anthony J. Corrado of the
Brookings Institute, “the rising financial demands of a presidential
campaign [have] rendered [the program’s] spending limits obso-
lete.”199  Moreover, Corrado notes that “[n]ow [public funding] is gen-
erally considered a losing strategy.  No candidate who hopes to
compete meaningfully will accept it.”200  Senator John McCain (R-
Ariz.) expressed a similar view of the system in 2004, as he noted that
“there are considerable incentives for some candidates to opt out of
public financing.”201  Despite this view, and perhaps in the hopes of
salvaging the system, McCain accepted public funds in 2008.202
Congress enacted the presidential public campaign finance provi-
sions under the assumption “that candidates for the presidency would
better use their time on some task other than raising campaign
funds.”203  Public financing proponents argue, “[t]he pursuit of money
has become a campaign in and of itself.  This comes with a price for
democracy.  Candidates could better spend their time meeting with
voters, and incumbents could better use their time to perform their
official duties.”204  However, as exhibited by Barack Obama’s viral
marketing campaign in 2008 and George W. Bush’s fundraising net-
work of “bundlers” in the 2000 primaries, fundraising is not necessa-
rily always as distracting and burdensome as defenders of the public
financing program claim.205  Case in point: President Obama needed
197. See Michael D. Shear, September Is the Best Fundraising Month for Obama in
2012, Post in The Caucus Blog, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2012, 9:13 PM), http://the-
caucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/september-is-the-best-fund-raising-month-
for-obama-in-2012/.
198. Campaign Fund, supra note 151.
199. Anthony Corrado, The Lost Hope for Campaign Reform, Room for Debate, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/13/did-
any-good-come-of-watergate/the-promise-of-campaign-reform-has-largely-been-
broken.
200. Brian C. Mooney, Post-Watergate Campaign Funding Reforms Fade Away, BOS.
GLOBE (June 21, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2012/06/21/
publicfunding/PjLaAsVVb8kAU25MunSKaN/story.html.
201. John McCain, Reclaiming Our Democracy: The Way Forward, 3 ELECTION L.J.
115, 120 (2004).
202. 2012 Presidential Campaign Finance, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.
fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do (last visited June 28, 2013).
203. Samples, supra note 189, at 13.
204. Id. (quoting Peter L. Francia & Paul S. Herrnson, Begging for Bucks, CAMPAIGNS
& ELECTIONS, Apr. 2001, at 51).
205. Karen Tumulty, Obama’s Viral Marketing Campaign, TIME, July 16, 2007, at 38,
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1640402,00.html.
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just sixty people to raise $2.4 million at a fundraiser in Manhattan in
July of 2012.206
The campaign process is also procedurally different.  The party
nomination process has become “front-loaded” in the recent past.207
As noted by Fred Wertheimer of Democracy21, “[s]tates have been
playing leapfrog in a rush to move up the dates of their primaries and
caucuses.”208  Consequently, the starting point of the nomination pro-
cess has been moved up, but Election Day has remained the first Tues-
day in November.  This phenomenon has critically impacted the
campaign process by creating “a prolonged process that [has] fatigued
voters and candidates alike” and, more importantly for the presiden-
tial funding system, has made “today’s presidential races increasingly
expensive.”209  Front-loading thus creates a system in which only the
rich candidates or those able to raise large amounts of money sur-
vive.210  Candidates “that enter the race are often forced to exit pre-
maturely because of an inability to raise the massive amounts needed
to continue their candidacies.”211  The rich, or at least well-funded
candidates, are ultimately the only ones who reach the finish line.
The 2012 election cycle was the most expensive cycle in the coun-
try’s history, with more than $6 billion being spent on the federal
level.212  The sheer cost of campaigning for federal office has rendered
the old model of publicly funding campaigns obsolete.  The cost of
campaigning for federal office has exploded, whether a candidate is
running a local congressional race, a state-wide senate race, or the
presidential race.
Beyond the effect of improved campaign solicitation and front-
loaded primaries on the cost of elections, the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Citizens United pushed the 2012 election cycle to
even greater spending heights.  Citizens United led to an unprece-
dented level of independent spending in the 2012 election cycle.213  As
a result, candidates for office now must raise enough money not only
to defeat their opponents but also to combat a new wave of outside
spending.  This new threat of well-funded independent groups puts
206. Kenneth P. Vogel, The Myth of the Small Donor, POLITICO (Aug. 7, 2012, 4:27
AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0812/79421.html.
207. Wertheimer, supra note 195.
208. Id.
209. Matthew T. Sanderson, Two Birds, One Stone: Reversing “Frontloading” by Fix-
ing the Presidential Public Funding System, 25 J.L. & POL. 279, 283-84 (2009)
(footnote omitted).
210. Id. at 285.
211. Id. (footnote omitted).
212. The Money Behind the Elections, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS.,
www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (showing spending of
$6.2 billion in 2012).
213. Outside Spending, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., http://www.opensecrets.org/
outsidespending/index.php (last visited June 29, 2013).
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pressure on campaigns to raise as much money as possible and inevi-
tably forgo the underfunded and antiquated public funding system.
The Citizens United groups’ avalanche of new independent spend-
ing214 has made it increasingly hard to publicly finance a campaign
because of independent groups’ ability to spend unlimited amounts in
any race.215  In the presidential race, over 25% of all spending was
done, not by the candidates or political parties, but by independent
groups.216
Independent groups supported President Obama with $131 million
in the 2012 election.217 This accounted for 12% of the spending on be-
half of the President; despite the fact that more than $1 billion was
spent in total for his reelection.218  In comparison, independent groups
supported Mitt Romney with $418 million, 34% of the total spending
on the Republican side.219  The Republican-minded independent ex-
penditures were five times the amount of funding Mitt Romney would
have received through the presidential matching fund (approximately
$91 million).  Clearly, no candidate can accept the financial limita-
tions imposed by the presidential matching fund when independent
groups can outspend a $91 million campaign by hundreds of millions
of dollars.
Opting out of the public financing systems is not exclusive to the
presidential race—Chris Christie opted out of the New Jersey state
public financing system for the Governor’s race because it would limit
his fundraising.220  While the 2008 election almost certainly marked
the impending demise of publicly financed presidential campaigns, the
2012 election and the rise in outside spending put the final nails in the
coffin of the presidential matching fund.  The cost of running a na-
tional presidential campaign simply dwarfs the $91 million that a
214. Reity O’Brien & Andrea Fuller, Court Opened Door to $933 Million in New Elec-
tion Spending, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 16, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.
publicintegrity.org/2013/01/16/12027/court-opened-door-933-million-new-election
-spending.
215. Outside Spending, supra note 213.
216. 2012 Presidential Race, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., http://www.opensecrets.
org/pres12 /index.php (last visited June 30, 2013).
217. Id.
218. Id.; Paul Blumenthal, Barack Obama, Mitt Romney Fundraising: Obama
Reaches Milestone of $1 Billion Raised, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 26, 2012, 8:58
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/26/barack-obama-mitt-romney-fun-
draising-capaigns_n_2021029.html.
219. 2012 Presidential Race, supra note 216.
220. Melissa Hayes, Christie Won’t Seek State Matching Funds for Primary Election,
Post in The Political State, N. JERSEY (Jan. 15, 2013, 11:28 AM), http://blog.north
jersey.com/thepoliticalstate/6257/christie-wont-seek-state-matching-funds-for-
primary-election/.
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publicly financed campaign has available and makes the system
obsolete.221
Neither has the presidential funding system been altered to reflect
the reality of an early primary calendar.  The FEC does not disburse
the public funds until January 1 of the election year.  However, due to
the early primaries, candidates have to start their campaign months
earlier, ultimately leaving them without the aid of public funds.222
The 108th Congress (2003–2005) introduced legislation to remedy this
problem by moving the starting date for primary fund payments from
January 1 of the election year to July 1 of the prior year.223  Congress
never voted on the bill, however, leaving FECA untouched.224
221. Presidential Election Campaign Fund, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.
fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.shtml.
222. JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32786, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELEC-
TION CAMPAIGN FUND AND TAX CHECKOFF: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT ISSUES 9
(2005).
223. Id. at 11–12.
224. Id.  In addition to the solution proposed to Congress to have public funds dis-
bursed at an earlier date, proposals have been made to do the exact opposite—
push the disbursements to a later date in order to combat the consequences of
front-loading.  Sanderson, supra note 209, at 307–08.  Under such a plan, pro-
posed by Matthew T. Sanderson, former counsel for John McCain’s presidential
campaign committee and former chief of staff and general counsel for Governor
Jon Huntsman Jr.’s Commission on Strengthening Utah’s Democracy, primary
“matching funds” disbursements would be pushed to October 1 of the year before
the election and general election disbursements would be pushed to April 1 of the
election year. Id.  According to Sanderson, such changes would serve as “counter-
vailing force[s],” encouraging candidates to enter into the race at a later date. Id.
at 308.  Candidates could, of course, use private contributions to fund their par-
ticipation in the earlier contests, but the government would not match these con-
tributions. Id.  Candidates, therefore, would be “leav[ing government] money on
the table.” Id. at 307.
Furthermore, in addition to altering the timetable for the disbursement of
public funds, Sanderson’s plan calls for, inter alia, an increase in the personal
spending limit, the elimination of state-by-state spending limits, an increase in
the ratio of primary matching funds to four-to-one for the first $100 contributed
prior to October 1, and a switch from a grant to matching funds for the general
election to infuse private contributions and encourage citizen participation. Id.
at 311–24.  Sanderson also suggests eliminating any limit on the total amount of
public funds a candidate can receive. Id. at 316.  Such a change would establish a
“free-for-all” program in which a candidate “actively seek[ing] matching funds
[could] simultaneously enlarge his share while shrinking his opponents’.” Id. at
316–17.  For example, if this policy were in place in 2008 when President Obama
opted out of the program, Senator McCain would have received the entire presi-
dential fund—i.e. $168.2 million. Id. at 317.  Senator McCain would have
doubled what he actually received in 2008, which totaled approximately $84.1
million. Id. at 323.  Sanderson argues that creating a “free-for-all” system incen-
tivizes the acceptance of public funding, as candidates would be reluctant to
“open the door for [their] opponents to receive a greater infusion of public dol-
lars.” Id. at 317.
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The future of the presidential campaign financing system is bleak.
Calls for reform have been heard, but none of them have been an-
swered.  Policy proposals have been made to “fix” the system, but none
of them have translated into legislation.225  Finding the right solution
to the campaign finance conundrum has proven to be a near impossi-
ble task.  As one commentator frames the matter:
On the one hand, it’s imperative to make the system sufficiently attractive to
candidates, including and perhaps especially, the top-tier candidates, so that
they will voluntarily choose to opt into the system . . . .  On the other hand,
you can’t make the system so attractive that it either becomes insupportably
expensive as a practical matter, or it imposes so few constraints on the candi-
dates that it fails to achieve its core public policy goals, such as encouraging
small contributions or restraining the overall cost of the presidential
campaigns.226
Until the above-described optimal balance is reached, candidates,
like Governor Mitt Romney, will almost certainly continue to follow
President Obama’s lead and opt out of public campaign financing in
future elections.  The benefits of using public funds are simply no
longer worth the drawbacks.  Ultimately, so long as checkoff participa-
tion remains low, participant spending limits remain static, and can-
didates continue to raise exorbitant amounts of money through
private donations, the system will continue to be rendered obsolete.
As the foregoing demonstrates, however, most of that obsolescence is
attributable to fiscal, practical, and political (as opposed to legal)
constraints.
4. Beware the Ides of the Millionaire’s Amendment
To the extent that jurisprudence within the realm of campaign fi-
nance—but outside the realm of public financing—foreshadowed the
impending legal demise of systems other than those that track the
pragmatically hamstrung fixed-sum model of the presidential system,
the seeds of doubt were most evidently sown in the wake of the so-
called Millionaire’s Amendment to BCRA.  The Millionaire’s Amend-
ment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 was a trigger
provision that activated when a congressional candidate spent more
than $350,000 in personal funds.227  This threshold spending of a
“self-financing” candidate triggered a trebling of an opponent’s indi-
225. Another example is the proposal put forth by the Campaign Finance Institute,
which would increase the checkoff to $5, institute a 3:1 ratio for matching funds,
make public funds available earlier, increase primary spending limits, and create
an “escape hatch” for participating candidates in the event that their opponent
opts out of the system. THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, SO THE VOTERS MAY
CHOOSE . . . REVIVING THE PRESIDENTIAL MATCHING FUND SYSTEM (2005).
226. Sanderson, supra note 209, at 302 (quoting CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. & DEMOCRACY
21, PRESIDENTIAL PUBLIC FINANCING SYSTEM: REPAIRING THE SYSTEM CONFERENCE
REPORT 35 (2005)).
227. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 729 (2008).
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vidual contribution limits (from $2300 to $6900) and allowed for the
acceptance of unlimited coordinated party expenditures.228  Once a
“non-self-financing” candidate’s spending reached $350,000 through
the new regulatory scheme, the original contribution limits would be
re-instated.229
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Million-
aire’s Amendment in Davis v. Federal Election Commission.230  The
Court held that the asymmetrical spending limits unconstitutionally
burdened a self-financing candidate’s First Amendment right to spend
his or her own funds for campaign speech.231  Quoting Buckley, the
Court reasoned that a “candidate . . . has a First Amendment right to
engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly
to advocate his own election and . . . a cap on personal expenditures
imposes a substantial, clea[r] and direc[t] restraint on that right.”232
According to the Davis Court, the Buckley Court’s assertion that an-
ticorruption interests are in fact promoted by unlimited personal
spending still rings true.233  The use of personal funds reduces reli-
ance on “outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive
pressures and attendant risks of abuse to which . . . contribution limi-
tations are directed.”234  Consistent with prior rejections of the equali-
zation and deliberative democracy rationales,235 the Court rejected
the notion that leveling the playing field as between a well-resourced
self-funded candidate and the candidate’s opponents likewise failed to
justify limits representing an “infringement of fundamental First
Amendment rights.”236  One of the more notable parentheticals the
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 736–44.
232. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52–53
(1976) (per curiam).
233. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 738.
234. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53).
235. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ([P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only
legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting
campaign finances.”) (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); Randall v. Sor-
rell, 548 U.S. 230, 268 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring) ( [T]he interests the Court
has recognized as compelling, i.e., the prevention of corruption or the appearance
thereof.”). Buckley itself was an outright denial of equalization as a compelling
state interest: “[E]qualizing the financial resources of candidates” does not pro-
vide a justification for limiting campaign resources, especially since equalization
might “handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition or expo-
sure of his views before the start of the campaign.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56–57.
The Buckley Court concluded “the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” Id. at 48–49.
236. Davis, 554 U.S. at 738 (2008) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54).
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Court puts forward in support of its anti-equalization position quotes
Justice Kennedy, although in dissent: “[T]he notion that the govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in restricting the quantity of speech to
equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections is antithetical
to the First Amendment.”237
Of critical moment to the Davis Court was the decision a self-fi-
nanced candidate faced when approaching the $350,000.00 threshold:
refrain from further speech, which keeps the contribution playing field
level, or continue spending and potentially expand the speech capacity
of the opponent.238  The Court considered the elimination of a non-
self-financed candidate’s spending limits as a result of opponent
threshold spending a “penalty on any candidate who robustly exer-
cises [his or her] First Amendment right.”239  The Eight Circuit’s deci-
sion in Day v. Holahan was cited favorably in support of this
conclusion.240  The Day court held that a Minnesota law increasing a
candidate’s spending limits in response to independent expenditures
in favor of the opponent “impaired” the speech of those making the
independent expenditures.241
Moreover, “[l]eveling electoral opportunities means making and
implementing judgments about which strengths should be permitted
to contribute to the outcome of an election.”242  Article I, § 2 of the
Constitution confers upon the voters the power to choose members of
the House of Representatives, and it is a dangerous precedent to allow
Congress to influence that choice by allowing Congress to limit the
ways in which challengers can fund their campaign.243
Atmospherically at least, that concern may have been sourced in
part with overlapping concerns that the Millionaire’s Amendment rep-
resented a form of incumbent-protection. Professor Joel Gora of Brook-
lyn Law School posits that although the Millionaire’s Amendment was
facially neutral with respect to incumbents and challengers, on a prac-
tical level, it could be seen to serve incumbents.244  Incumbents al-
most never have to rely on their own funds, because they can raise
copious amounts of private funding.245  Professor Richard Briffault of
237. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 705 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
238. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 739.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Day v. Holohan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting the statute “infringes
on. . .protected speech because of the chilling effect the statute has on the politi-
cal speech of the person or group making the independent expenditure.”).
242. Davis, 554 U.S. at 742.
243. Id.; see First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.31 (1977) (The
“[g]overnment is forbidden to assume the task of ultimate judgment, lest the peo-
ple lose their ability to govern themselves.”).
244. Gora, supra note 143, at 105.
245. Id. at 105–06.
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Columbia Law School noted that reformers viewed the complete elimi-
nation of spending limits for non-self-financed candidates as self-serv-
ing for the same reason.246
D. The Supreme Court Pulls the Trigger on Trigger-
Matching Funds
Since Buckley, legally speaking, the risk-averse route for states or
smaller jurisdictions seeking to implement public financing has been
to track the fixed “lump” sum model in Buckley itself, along with simi-
lar commensurate limits for the candidates who choose to participate
in the systems.  These systems mirror either the presidential primary
system of matching small donations up to a certain level or the presi-
dential general election system of a single lump sum for the entire
election.  Little need be said regarding such a model except to note
that a state model of this type shares the presidential system’s de jure
constitutional status but also shares its de facto moribundity.  It is,
therefore, unsurprising that states interested in adopting public fi-
nancing for campaigns for state office sought a means of balancing the
facilitation aspects of deliberative democracy and equalization with
the desire to protect the state treasury from unnecessary spending.
The key manner through which states attempted to forge that bal-
ance was via the mechanism of so-called “trigger” matching funds.
Such funds were long seen as “crucial to persuading candidates to ac-
cept public funding and the spending limit that always accompanies
public subsidies [because] [w]ithout the option of raising and spending
above the public funding spending limit when running against a high-
spending candidate, few serious candidates would accept public
funding.”247
Although the Court was not presented with questions involving
public financing, Davis’s citation with approval to the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in Day for the proposition that, in the Supreme Court’s words,
a statute that “increased a candidate’s expenditure limits and eligibil-
ity for public funds based on independent expenditures against her
candidacy burdened the speech of those making the independent ex-
penditures,”248 foreshadowed Arizona Free Enterprise, and the ratio-
nale that would prove to undo matching funds.
The Court adopted the idea that, despite not being a spending re-
striction per se, spending limits that trigger matching funds place a
burden on free speech.  By presenting a candidate with the choice of
either limiting his or her own privately funded campaign or benefiting
246. Richard Briffault, Davis v. FEC: The Roberts Court’s Continuing Attack on Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 44 TULSA L. REV. 475, 479 (2009).
247. Id. at 476.
248. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n,, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008).
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the opponent and losing the benefit of not being subject to spending
limits like a publicly financed opponent would be, the privately funded
candidate is less likely to exercise his or her right to speech and faces
a burden.  Still, many public-financing proponents didn’t realize it at
the time.  Richard Briffault, writing shortly after Davis, and prior to
Arizona Free Enterprise, was a notable exception:
Nearly all of the lower federal courts that, prior to Davis, had heard chal-
lenges to state laws triggering a release from the spending limit or the provi-
sion of additional public funds in response to high levels of opposition funding
upheld those laws.  But Davis, which cited the one lower federal court that
went the other way, suggests that these state laws may now be in serious
constitutional difficulty.249
Prior to Davis, as Professor Briffault intimates, the majority of
courts that had addressed First Amendment challenges to trigger-
matching funds had upheld them,250 noting, in particular, the facilita-
tion role that the matching funds play in promoting rather than con-
straining speech. The First Circuit, for example, found that the
arguments of those challenging trigger-matching funds could be sum-
marized as follows: “Essentially, their argument boils down to a claim
of a First Amendment right to outraise and outspend an opponent, a
right that they complain is burdened by the matching funds
clause.”251  Further, the Daggett court found that such a challenge
fundamentally “misconstrue[s] the meaning of the First Amendment’s
protection of their speech.  They have no right to speak free from re-
sponse—the purpose of the First Amendment is to secure the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources.”252
Daggett and the decisions akin to it are thus entirely consistent
with Justice Kagan’s dissent in Arizona Free Enterprise in which she
asserts, inter alia, that the challenge in that case involved the chal-
lengers’ “novel argument: that Arizona violated their First Amend-
ment rights by disbursing funds to other speakers even though they
could have received (but chose to spurn) the same financial assis-
tance.”253  On the contrary, Daggett rejected the reasoning in Day as
“equat[ing] responsive speech with an impairment to the initial
249. Briffault, supra note 246, at 479.
250. See, e.g., Daggett v. Comm’n. on Gov’tl. Ethics & Elec. Pracs., 205 F.3d 445, 450
(1st Cir. 2000); N.C. Right to Life Comm. v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir.
2008); Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 1998); Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez,
101 F.3d 1544, 1546 (8th Cir. 1996); Ass’n. of Am. Phys. & Surgeons v. Brewer,
363 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1202–03 (D. Ariz. 2005); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield,
537 F. Supp. 2d 359, 391–92 (D. Conn. 2008).
251. Daggett, 205 F.3d at 464.
252. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
253. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2835
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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speaker.”254  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in upholding a challenge to
the trigger-matching funds at the heart of North Carolina’s public fi-
nancing system for judicial elections, found that:
[P]laintiffs remain free to raise and spend as much money, and engage in as
much political speech, as they desire.  They will not be jailed, fined, or cen-
sured if they exceed the trigger amounts.  The only (arguably) adverse conse-
quence that will occur is the distribution of matching funds to [participants].
But this does not impinge on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.  To the
contrary, the distribution of these funds “furthers, not abridges, pertinent
First Amendment values” by ensuring that the participating candidate will
have an opportunity to engage in responsive speech.255
The 180-degree difference as between the perspectives in the circuits
regarding trigger-matching funds, along with the Davis Court’s ap-
proving citation of Day, made it only a matter of time before the Su-
preme Court would take up the matter directly. Arizona Free
Enterprise, a case that had gone through several rounds of trial and
circuit review and remands,256 presented the issue squarely.
One year after Citizens United, the Supreme Court again weighed
in on a matter of campaign finance law, albeit in a case that, at least
nationally, had a much lower profile.  The challenge to the Arizona
public financing system mirrored the challenges considered in cases
described above, such as Daggett, Day, and Leake, insofar as the chal-
lenge focused on the trigger-matching funds (Arizona called them “res-
cue funds”) provided to participating candidates.
Under the Arizona statute, any eligible candidate running for Gov-
ernor, secretary of state, attorney general, treasurer, superintendent
of public instruction, the corporation commission, mine inspector, and
state legislature (House and Senate) could choose to participate in the
public financing system, with eligibility contingent only on a modest
threshold number of contributions from Arizona voters, and the par-
ticipants’ agreement to certain campaign finance restrictions (e.g.,
limiting personal expenditures to $500).257  As with other matching
funds-based programs, and in contrast to the fixed-sum presidential
model, Arizona provided participating candidates an initial allotment
254. Daggett, 205 F.3d at 465.
255. N.C. Right to Life Comm., 524 F.3d at 437 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92–93).
256. Petitioners, plaintiffs in the original action, were past and future candidates of
Arizona state office, as well as independent expenditure groups that participate
in Arizona state elections. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2816.  The Petitioners
challenged the constitutionality of the Arizona public campaign finance provision
providing for rescue funds in federal district court, which granted an injunction
against further implementation of the provision on the merits but stayed imple-
mentation of the injunction pending appeal. Id.  The Ninth Circuit stayed the
district court’s injunction pending appeal and subsequently reversed the district
court’s decision on the merits. Id.  The Supreme Court stayed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, vacated the stay of the district court’s injunction, and subsequently
granted certiorari. Id.
257. Id. at 2814–15.
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of public campaign funds, and then, when certain conditions were ob-
tained, the state granted these candidates additional “equalizing” or
rescue funds.258
A group of political candidates and Political Action Committees
challenged the Act’s matching-fund program, contending that the pro-
gram burdened their First Amendment right of free speech.259  The
petitioners claimed that as privately financed candidates, their speech
was chilled by the looming threat of triggering matching funds for
their publicly financed opponents.260  The plaintiffs argued that, by
providing matching funds when a privately financed candidate raises
more money, it unconstitutionally restricts the privately financed can-
didate’s speech by discouraging them from raising additional funds.
The district court, applying strict scrutiny, and after analyzing Su-
preme Court precedent including Buckley and Davis, decided that the
matching-funds program of the Act did not serve a compelling state
interest, was not narrowly tailored, was not the least restrictive
means of “achiev[ing] the anticorruption goal,” and was therefore un-
constitutional.261  The district court was reversed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, which held, after applying intermediate scrutiny, that the
matching-funds program of the Act was not unconstitutional.262  Cit-
ing Citizens United and Buckley, the Ninth Circuit reasoned:
The State has a sufficiently important interest in preventing corruption and
the appearance of corruption.  The record demonstrates that Arizona has a
long history of quid pro quo corruption. . . . As the Supreme Court has recog-
nized, the State’s interest in eradicating the appearance of quid pro quo cor-
ruption to restore the electorate’s confidence in its system of government is
not “illusory,” it is substantial and compelling.263
Further, the court noted the additional State interest in promoting
participation in the public financing program through matching
funds.264  Arizona’s victory was short-lived.
A 5–4 Supreme Court majority held the matching-fund program
unconstitutional because it based the receipt of matching funds on the
additional spending or fundraising of the privately funded candidate.
The Court reasoned that this choice that the privately funded candi-
date could stop raising or spending money once he reached the match-
258. Id. at 2814.
259. Id. at 2816.
260. Id.; McComish v. Brewer, No. CV-08-1550-PHX-ROS, 2010 WL 2292213, at *7 (D.
Ariz.), rev’d and remanded sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 605 F.3d 720, opinion
amended and superseded, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free
Enter., 131 S. Ct. 2806, and aff’d, 653 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiffs allege
they will refrain from raising funds or spending their personal monies to prevent
participating candidates from receiving matching funds.”).
261. McComish, 2010 WL 2292213, at *7–8.
262. McComish, 611 F.3d at 525.
263. Id. (citation omitted).
264. Id. at 526.
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ing limit or continue to raise and spend money but benefit his
opponent restricted the privately financed candidate’s right to free
speech by restricting his political speech.  The Court identified three
reasons why the matching-funds program of the Act unconstitution-
ally burdened the privately funded candidates’ free speech.265  First,
privately funded speech or campaign financing was the trigger for au-
tomatic-matching public funds thereby discouraging privately funded
candidates from raising money beyond the initial public financing
amount.266  Second, the matching-funds program put the wealthy can-
didate who does not choose to participate in the public option in a posi-
tion where each spent dollar could generate multiple dollars for his
opposition, given the potential for more than one publicly financed op-
ponent.267 Third, the public candidate could continue to benefit from
matching funds even if the privately funded candidate has stopped
spending because the spending of independent political action groups
also triggered rescue funds.268
The privately financed candidate would benefit his opponent not
only if he spent more money, but also if an independent group spent
funds supporting the privately financed candidate.269  The very notion
that in order to not help his opponent a privately funded candidate
has to limit his own fundraising and campaign spending while also
hoping that independent groups, which the candidate cannot coordi-
nate with, stay out of the race as well, burdens the privately funded
candidate’s speech.270  The privately financed candidate’s speech is
burdened because the state has limited, albeit not with a hard spend-
ing limit, the amount of money he can use for his campaign which
places a “substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech.”271
The Arizona Free Enterprise Court emphasized the private candidate’s
lack of control over independent political group spending, which also
allowed the publicly financed candidate to realize the benefit of rescue
funds.272  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority and relying
on Buckley, reasoned “[a]ny increase in speech resulting from the Ari-
zona law is of one kind and one kind only—that of publicly financed
candidates.  The burden imposed on privately financed candidates and
independent expenditure groups reduces their speech.”273  However,
265. Steven J. Andre´, Government Election Advocacy: Implications of Recent Supreme
Court Analysis, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 894 (2012).
266. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2818–19
(2011).
267. Id. at 2819.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 2820. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 2820.
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this ostensible reduction in speech for which the matching funds are
apparently responsible involves not only one, but two, entirely volun-
tary choices made solely by the “burdened” parties—first, the candi-
date’s choice not to participate in the public financing scheme and,
second, the choice by the candidate or independent groups not to
speak merely because their competitor might be able to respond.  In
the Chief Justice’s view, however:
[E]ven if the matching funds provision did result in more speech by publicly
financed candidates and more speech in general, it would do so at the expense
of impermissibly burdening (and thus reducing) the speech of privately fi-
nanced candidates and independent expenditure groups. This sort of “beggar
thy neighbor” approach to free speech—“restrict[ing] the speech of some ele-
ments of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others”—is
“wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”274
The Chief Justice is framing the issue as one where, rather than
leveling the playing field for publicly financed candidates, privately
financed candidates face restrictions.  The Chief notes that the Court
has “rejected government efforts to increase the speech of some at the
expense of others outside the campaign finance context.”275  In Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, Justice Kagan, with a nod to the
deliberative democracy and equalization of public discourse which the
Chief Justice found unjustified, found the trigger-matching funds
scheme promoted “responsive speech, competitive speech, the kind of
speech that drives public debate.”276
IV. PUBLIC FINANCING AFTER FREE ENTERPRISE
AND CITIZENS UNITED?
A. Non-Presidential Campaign Economics
For all the attention paid by the public to presidential contests rel-
ative to other campaigns, in many respects, major presidential candi-
dates have massive economies of scale working in their favor relative
to down-ballot candidates.  Major moneyed interest groups, individu-
als, and organizations recognize that, dollar-for-dollar, their greatest
impact is in close campaigns for non-presidential offices that nonethe-
less play a major role in state and federal policy and governance.  Ac-
cordingly, the recent upward surge in spending is far from limited to
presidential campaigns.  The costs of running a Senate or House race
have also vastly increased in the era of independent spending.
274. Id. at 2821 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)).
275. Id. at 2821.  The example provided is a decision holding a statute that required
newspapers assailing a candidate to print a response from the candidate was un-
constitutional. Id. (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tonillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974)).  This law was held unconstitutional despite the fact that, like the statute
in Free Enterprise, it might have increased total speech but its effect was to deter
speech in the first place. Id.
276. Id. at 2837 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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In the 2008 elections, the last presidential election cycle before Cit-
izens United, the most expensive Senate race had total spending of
$46 million while the most expensive House races totaled $12 mil-
lion.277  Only four short years later there were ten House races that
exceeded $15 million dollars each.278  Indeed, there were five congres-
sional races in which candidate spending alone—excluding indepen-
dent spending—totaled more than $11 million, with the most
expensive exceeding $25 million.279
The Senate increases are strikingly similar.  The four most expen-
sive Senate races of 2012 matched or exceeded the $46 million spent
by the most expensive race in 2008.280  The Massachusetts Senate
race between incumbent Scott Brown and challenger (and eventual
winner) Elizabeth Warren cost a combined $90 million.281  The magni-
tude of the expenses entailed in Senate elections, even more than in
House elections, becomes staggering when including outside spending.
In four races, outside spending exceeded the spending by the cam-
paigns themselves.282  The U.S. Senate race in Virginia alone saw
more than $52 million in outside spending—dwarfing the candidates’
own spending of $34 million.283  The only competitive race that did not
face large amounts of outside spending was the Massachusetts Senate
race.  This race saw less than $8 million in outside spending compared
to the $83 million spent by the candidates.284  This relatively small
amount (in comparison to other 2012 races) was a direct result of both
candidates reaching an agreement in an attempt to limit the influence
of independent groups on the election.285  The agreement was largely
successful, with only about $3.5 million in outside spending occurring
in the ten months between reaching the agreement and the elec-
tion.286  On the other hand, with $83 million in expenditures by the
277. Most Expensive Races 2008, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., http://www.open
secrets.org/bigpicture/topraces.php?cycle=2008&display=currcands (last visited
Feb. 9, 2013) (click on “All candidates in race”).
278. Most Expensive Races 2012, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., http://www.open-
secrets.org/overview/topraces.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (click on “Candidate
+ Outside group spending: all candidates”).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Manu Raju, Scott Brown, Elizabeth Warren Call for Super PAC Cease-Fire, POLIT-
ICO (Jan. 16, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71484.
html.
286. The candidates agreed to limit outside spending in January of 2012 after $3.5
million had already been spent. Id. The post-agreement $3.5 million was spent
in the last ten months of the campaign with about $1.4 million coming in the final
week. 2012 Race: Massachusetts Senate Outside Spending, CENTER FOR RESPON-
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candidates’ campaigns, it was hardly as if the agreement decreased
the critical role of big money in the contest.
In many respects, the current prominence of independent expendi-
tures in political campaigns is a direct result of Buckley,287 and as
such, is surprising only in the sense that the dynamic took as long to
develop as it did. Buckley upheld contribution limits but granted “in-
dependent” groups the right to limitless spending.  Large independent
expenditures, many of which are, from the perspective of the electo-
rate, barely distinguishable from the campaigns themselves, are posi-
tioned to have major impacts on elections.
Beyond the issue of disproportionate power for the wealthy, the
“independent” expenditures mean that noncitizens can influence elec-
tions, violating basic principles of Federalism and local government.
Contributors to independent groups often represent influences that
are sometimes geographically and otherwise disconnected from the
electorate of particular jurisdictions.288
Further, and particularly in races that formally represent a small
population—say a U.S. Senate seat representing a relatively rural
state—there simply aren’t enough citizens of a state, much less citi-
zens of a state who are in a position to spend on elections, to spend
meaningfully in the face of independent expenditure groups.  Major
independent expenditures inevitably influence the campaigns to a dis-
proportionate extent measured in terms of population.  This system
concentrates power, in the electoral sense, in an extraordinary stra-
tum of wealthy individuals and groups who can outspend entire
campaigns.
B. Outside Spending and the Infamous Super PAC
Only a very small percentage of the American population contrib-
utes any money to political campaigns.289  Americans who contribute,
in total, more than $200 to federal elections are a much smaller per-
SIVE POLS., http://www.opensecrets.org/races/indexp.php?cycle=2012&id=MAS1
(last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
287. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking down limits on candidate and
independent groups spending while upholding limits on direct contributions).
288. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DICTUM WITHOUT DATA: THE MYTH OF ISSUE ADVOCACY AND
PARTY BUILDING 7–11 (Ctr. for the Study of Elections & Democracy, Brigham
Young Univ., 2000) (discussing the results of an experiment in which advertise-
ments funded through soft money and issue advocacy were indistinguishable
from those that were funded by the candidates—an overwhelming amount of vot-
ers perceived the soft money/issue advocacy ads as those funded by the
candidates).
289. Donor Demographics, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., http://www.opensecrets.
org/overview /donordemographics.php (last visited Jan. 26. 2012).
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centage still, representing just .4% of the population.290  However,
this tiny sliver of the population gives more than two-thirds of all
money given to candidates, parties, and independent groups in federal
elections.291  Candidates are overwhelmingly dependent upon large
contributors who still fund the majority of political spending even at
the higher profile federal level.  Candidates, political parties, and
outside groups rely on the same small segment of the population to
fund the majority of their spending. Privately financed campaigns
have led to a system where .4% of the population provides almost all of
the monetary support that candidates need to win elections.292  As
Larry Lessig eloquently puts it: “No more than .05 percent give the
maximum in any Congressional campaign.  A career focused on the 1
percent—or, worse, the .05 percent—will never earn them the confi-
dence of the 99 percent.”293
The .05% has the ability to disproportionally influence election by
being able to “speak” louder, longer, and to a much larger audience,
through the use of independent groups, than does the public as a
whole.  The wealthy donors that make up such a small percentage of
the population nevertheless exert an incredible amount of influence
over politics simply because they can afford more speech than the av-
erage voter.  The single top contributor to independent groups gave
$93 million in the 2012 election.294  To put that in stark perspective:
this single person’s contributions to independent groups exceed the
presidential matching-fund limit.295  The top 100 donors gave a total
of $350 million to support independent groups.296  The groups these
donors supported spent over $1.4 billion on federal elections during
the 2012 election cycle—a 400% increase from the outside spending
during the 2010 and 2008 elections.297
The explosion in independent spending is a direct result of the
structure of the campaign finance system.  As is extensively detailed
290. Id.  For further discussion of the limited influence of small donors see Part III.C.
infra.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Lawrence Lessig, Op-Ed., More Money Can Beat Big Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2011, at A31, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/opinion/in-cam-
paign-financing-more-money-can-beat-big-money.html?_r=0.
294. 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS.,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=D (last visited Jan.
26, 2013).
295. Presidential Election Campaign Fund, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.
fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
296. 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, supra note 294.
297. Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, CENTER
FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.
php, (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).  Total outside spending was $338 million in
2008, $304 million in 2010, and $1.4 billion in 2012. Id.
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by numerous commentators,298 Citizens United, along with lower
court and FEC decisions, has led to the creation of so-called super
PACs.299  Outside groups spent over $1.4 billion of the $6 billion spent
in the 2012 election cycle.300  This influx of unregulated money is sim-
ilar to the influx that was—temporarily—addressed by the 2002 Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act.301  As discussed earlier, BCRA was
passed in 2002 and then later upheld almost in its entirety in McCon-
nell v. FEC.302  BCRA attempted to address the use of “soft money” in
federal elections.303  The threat of large unregulated contributions to
political parties led to the banning of soft money because of the risk of
corruption and abuse of the system.  Contribution limits ultimately
fail to serve a purpose if the limits can be easily avoided by contribut-
ing money directly to a party.304
A similar problem now exists with the development of super PACs
that exist solely to support an individual candidate in a single race.305
Mitt Romney was able to use “his”306 super PAC, Restore Our Future,
to have an additional $161 million spent on his behalf that he would
have been prohibited from spending under the contribution limits ap-
plicable to candidates.307
298. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1685-86 (2012);
John Dunbar, The ‘Citizens United’ Decision and Why It Matters, CENTER FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 18, 2012, 6:12 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/10/
18/11527/citizens-united-decision-and-why-it-matters.
299. Briffault, supra note 298, at 1645.  The phrase “super PAC” does not appear in
any regulation or FEC rule; it is the common name for any independent expendi-
ture-only group created under FEC advisory opinions following Citizens United.
Id.
300. Outside Spending, supra note 213.
301. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002);
Bauer, supra note 120, at 507.
302. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
303. Id. at 132.  Soft money refers to, at least in the context of BCRA, money contrib-
uted to political parties that does not fall within the scope of FECA and other
campaign finance regulations.  Meredith Johnston, Stopping “Winks and Nods”:
Limits on Coordination as a Means of Regulating 527 Organizations, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1166, 1171 n.19 (2006).
304. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114.
305. See Briffault, supra note 298, at 1679.
306. Independent groups are not allowed to coordinate their expenditures or activities
with candidates, but, because of the loose standards that now exist, many such
groups have done so regardless. See Peter R. Barbieri, Putting the “Independent”
Back Into “Independent Expenditure,” The Need for Stronger Coordination Rules
in the Post-Citizens United Era (May 1, 2013) (unpublished law review Note, Hof-
stra University) (on file with author); Briffault, supra note 298, at 1680–82.
307. See, e.g., Restore Our Future Recipients, 2012, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.open-
secrets.org/outsidespending/recips.php?cmte=Restore+Our+Future&cycle=2012
(last visited Jan. 20, 2013) (showing how all the money spent by Restore Our
Future was spent supporting Mitt Romney or used against one of his opponents).
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Candidates in a competitive race now must prepare to face oppo-
nents backed by well-financed independent groups.  This has led can-
didate campaigns, via surrogates who are dubiously disconnected
from the campaigns, to create independent groups to support their
candidate by raising money and spending it on advocacy.308  Indepen-
dent groups are already frequently used to circumvent contribution
limits and practically as a wing of the campaign. Such groups are
often started by former staffers or even family members and have
messages that, for the average voter, are almost indistinguishable
from the campaign’s. For purposes of this article, the elephant in the
room, however, is this: for any publicly funded system to even be seri-
ously considered as an option by serious candidates, it must take into
account the new realities, numbers, and magnitude of the system in
which independent groups are playing a more important role than
ever.
C. The Third Way of Public Campaign Finance: Small-Donor
Matching
One strictly fiscal consequence of the new normal in political ex-
penditures is that fixed-sum public financing systems akin to the pres-
idential model cannot conceivably come close to keeping pace with
spiraling campaign costs.309  To offer participating candidates a sum
that would allow them to effectively respond to privately and indepen-
dently financed opponents would require enormous outlays of public
resources.  Even if such outlays were not disqualifying in themselves,
they would entail significant wasted expense on noncompetitive races
because the sums would have to be determined ex ante, i.e., long in
advance of knowing whether any particular campaign would actually
be competitive.
One potential rejoinder to the above reasoning is the notion that a
fixed-sum public financing scheme need not keep pace with indepen-
dent expenditures at all.  At least as a matter of formalism, given the
lack of coordination, public money might be spent on behalf of partici-
pating candidates who nonetheless received major independent expen-
308. T.W. Farnam, Romney-Rove Get-Together Again Raises Super PAC/Candidate
Coordination Issue, WASH. POST (June 22, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/election-2012/post/romney-rove-get-togther-again-raises-super-pac-
candidate-coordination-issue/2012/06/22/gJQAvSYSvV_blog.html (discussing
how Mitt Romney has raised money “several times” for the Restore Our Future
PAC); see also Briffault, supra note 298, at 1677 (discussing how the congres-
sional leadership of each party organized and then solicited funds for Super
PACs).
309. The presidential matching fund has clearly failed to keep up with the cost of cur-
rent campaigns, which now reach nearly $1 billion for each candidate. 2012 Pres-
idential Race, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/
index.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
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diture support. However, this fails to address the issue that, without
keeping pace with independent groups, taxpayers would be funding
campaigns despite the fact that candidates would still be reliant on
the same sliver of moneyed individuals who fund independent groups.
Further, imagine the political prospects of pitching such a system to
the taxpayers, especially when any sums that would incentivize par-
ticipation would often be wasted on noncompetitive races.
Matching funds mitigate the practical problem by reducing the ex
ante financial outlay and reserving the additional public expenditures
for the races in which expenditures on behalf of a nonparticipant ex-
ceed the thresholds.  Post-Free Enterprise, however, this option is now
unconstitutional despite the fact that it is both fiscally responsible
and politically viable.310
Many scholars311 and advocates312 favor a constitutional amend-
ment.  Given the difficulty of that route, the question is whether there
is a viable third way to replace the pragmatically hamstrung fixed-
sum model, and the legally hamstrung matching funds model.
The most promising “third way” for public financing systems may
be those that operate to amplify the role of small donors.  Within that
genre, New York City’s small-donor matching funds program is a
widely praised model.313 Enacted in the late 1980s and revised again
in 2001 and 2005,314 New York City’s is the longest running small
donor-matching program in the United States.315  Currently, the pro-
gram matches, on a six-to-one basis, the first $175 of a campaign do-
nation.316  The small donor program appears to have had some
success in serving the equalization interest that animates a modicum
310. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826–28
(2011).
311. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST 290–304 (2011) (arguing that the
campaign finance needs substantial reform, suggesting a constitutional
amendment).
312. The Solution: The People’s Rights Amendment, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, http://
freespeechforpeople.org/the-solution (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).  Free Speech for
People was started by John Bonifaz, an advocate for election and campaign fi-
nance reform. See, e.g., Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 60; John Bonifaz & Jamin
Raskin, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273
(1993).
313. See Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe & Brendan Glavin, Small Donors, Big
Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and
States, 11 ELECTION L.J. 3, 3 (2012).
314. Id. at 5.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 4; see also Spencer Overton, Matching Political Contributions, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 1696, 1697 (2012) (explaining that New York City is the only American ju-
risdiction with a six-to-one matching ratio).  For every small donor that gives a
$175 contribution, the candidate receives the value of the original contribution
plus $1,050 in matching funds for a total of $1,225.  Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin,
supra note 313, at 4.
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of equalization (even if formally only sub silentio) insofar as it has in-
creased the ratio of small-to-large donors.317  Accordingly, many pro-
ponents advocate for its replication in state and federal elections.318
In 2012, Michael Malbin and Peter Brusoe studied the New York
City model with a particular eye on its potential for effective replica-
tion in other jurisdictions.319  Malbin and Brusoe first compared cam-
paign-financing disclosures from participating and nonparticipating
New York City candidates.  Generally, the study found that in 2009,
city council candidates that participated in the donor-matching pro-
gram had a much larger percentage of their funds raised by donors
who gave $250 or less (64%) than candidates who chose not to partici-
pate in the donor-matching program (37%).320  Using data from
1997–2009,321 Malbin and Brusoe found, however, that across the
board, candidates of all types increased the amount of money they re-
ceived from small donors, as reforms made reaching out to small do-
nors more lucrative: incumbents increased funds raised by small
donors by 27% from 2001 to 2009,322 and candidates in competitive
races increased this percentage by more than 50%.323  The New York
City small-donor matching system also avoids basing its trigger on a
privately funded candidate’s fundraising, the restriction that led to
the Free Enterprise decision.
Extrapolating, Malbin and Brusoe recommend that the New York
City system be expanded to the state level.324  They chart the average
make up of a state candidate’s campaign dollars based on their
source.325  The amount of money raised from small donors (giving
$250 or less) varies dramatically by state.326  As a percentage of total
campaign contributions, contributions from small donors range from a
dismal 4% in Alabama (which also has an astonishing 73% from non-
party organizations) to a 16% median in Tennessee to a 60% high in
317. Adam Skaggs & Fred Wertheimer, Empowering Small Donors in Federal Elec-
tions, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCH. OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 21, 14
(2012) http://brennan.3cdn.net/b71b1ef6391b3a4813_5jm6bwz6j.pdf.
318. Id.; see, e.g., Overton, supra note 316, at 1696–97.
319. Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 313, at 3.
320. Id.; see also Angela Migally & Susan Liss, SMALL DONOR MATCHING FUNDS: THE
NYC ELECTION EXPERIENCE 15 (2010).  On average, the New York City Council
candidate who participated in the program had twice the contributors and three
times the small contributors as the typical nonparticipating candidate. Id.
321. Though New York City’s donor-matching program goes back to the late 1980s,
statistics regarding nonparticipating candidates are only available starting at the
2000s’ reforms, as city officials only began keeping track of privately funded can-
didates after these reforms took place.  Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 313,
at 3.
322. Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 313, at 9.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 15–16.
325. Id. at 14.
326. Id.
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Minnesota327 (which has a small-donor incentive program), with NYC
elections even higher at 63%.328  Overlaying a five-to-one matching
program on the existing state data, Malbin and Brusoe posit that the
program would significantly increase the percentage of funds repre-
sented by small donors.329
Aspects of the New York City model have been implemented in
other parts of the country and have had modest success coaxing more
small donors participation.330  Nathaniel Gleicher notes that “[s]tate
candidates from Minnesota, for instance, raised forty-five percent of
their funds from donations of less than $100.  Similarly, state candi-
dates from Vermont raised twenty-six percent of their funds from
small donors.”331  Both these states have a small-donor matching pro-
gram.  Gleicher asserts that “[i]n each case, regulation seems to have
successfully refocused campaign fundraising on small donations.  This
is especially true for low-profile candidates whose counterparts in
other states without such regulation relied mainly on large donors.”332
Small-donor matching programs, like the one in New York City,
increase the power of small donors to try to keep up with the influence
wielded by large donors.  Ever since Barack Obama’s 2008 presiden-
tial campaign touted its reliance on small donors, there has been
much talk about the new importance of small donors in elections.333
Small donors are individuals who give less than $200, and the average
contribution from a small donor is about $62.334  Even with the so-
called small donor revolution and the influx of new small donors, espe-
cially in support of President Obama, campaign finance is still domi-
nated by large donors.  However, the majority of money in federal
elections does not come from small donors, and candidates still rely on
large donors to make up the majority of their funding.  Money pro-
327. Graham P. Ramsden & Patrick D. Donnay, The Impact of Minnesota’s Political
Contribution Refund Program on Small-Donor Behavior in State House Races, 33
ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 32, 33 (2001).
328. Malbin, Brusoe & Glavin, supra note 313, at 14.
329. Ramsden & Donnay, supra note 327, at 22; see also David Donnelly, We Need
More Citizen Participation, BOS. REV., (Sept. 10, 2010) http://www.bostonreview.
net/donnelly-citizen-participation  (suggesting Congress implement a nationwide
Matching Funds program as a vehicle for increased voter participation).
330. See Nathaniel J. Gleicher, Moneybombs and Democratic Participation: Regulat-
ing Fundraising by Online Intermediaries, 70 MD. L. REV. 750, 813 (2011); Rams-
den & Donnay, supra note 327, at 39.
331. Gleicher, supra note 330, at 813.
332. Id.
333. See Molly J. Walker Wilson, The New Role of the Small Donor in Political Cam-
paigns and the Demise of Public Funding, 25 J.L. & POL. 257 (2009).
334. Press Release, The Campaign Finance Institute, Reality Check: Obama Received
About the Same Percentage from Small Donors in 2008 as Bush in 2004 (Nov.
24, 2008), http://www.cfinst.org/press/preleases/08-11-24/Realty_Check_-_Obama
_Small_Donors.aspx.
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vided by small donors, in federal elections, is outweighed by large con-
tributions by a margin of two-to-one.335
The power of small donors, without the aid of matching funds, is
insufficient to counteract the influence of large donors.  As of the end
of June 2012 more than 2.5 million small donors had contributed less
than $200 to the presidential campaigns (or the committees that sup-
ported them) of Barack Obama and Mitt Romney.336  Those 2.5 mil-
lion small donors contributed about $148 million in total but only
account for 18% of all money contributed.337  In fact, a group of only
2100 donors who gave at least $50,000 contributed about $200 million,
far surpassing the collective amount given by small donors.338  For the
2012 campaign, small donations accounted for 32%339 of Barack
Obama’s total contributions and only 18%340 of Mitt Romney’s.  Even
for Barack Obama’s campaign, which has been very successful at at-
tracting small donors, more than two-thirds of all the money raised
comes from donors giving more than $200.  The reliance on larger do-
nors and the limited influence of small donors are more drastic in
races for other federal offices.  However, small-donor matching pro-
grams would help alleviate the reliance on large donors by both in-
creasing the power of current small donors and increasing the number
of small donors.  As seen in New York, more small donors will contrib-
335. Very few people give money to political campaigns, even including the recent in-
crease in small donors.  More than $3.3 billion was contributed by individuals to
political parties, campaigns, and PACs during the 2012 election. Donor Demo-
graphics 2012, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., http://www.opensecrets.org/over
view/donordemographics.php?cycle=2012&filter=A (last visited May 22, 2012).
However, the majority of this money comes not from small donors giving money
but from the .4% of the population who gave more than $200 during the 2012
election cycle. Id. This group provided more than two-thirds of all the money
contributed by individuals. Id.; see supra Part III-B.  Even within this smaller
group of active political contributors, the majority of total contributions come
from individuals who contributed more than $2,500 in total to federal candidates,
parties, and PACs. Id.  This group consists of about .08% of the population or
about 241,000 people total who contribute just over half of all individual contribu-
tions. Id.  To illustrate yet further, expanding the definition of “small donors” up
to an unrealistic level to include people who gave anything less than $2,500 in
total political contributions, the majority of all political contributions to federal
candidates, parties, and PACs in the 2012 election came from large donors. Id.
As the system stands today, without a viable public-financing system, candidates
simply cannot rely solely on small donors alone and must be able to raise money
from the few large donors who make up the majority of political spending to have
a viable candidacy.
336. Vogel, supra note 206.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Small contributions accounted for $233 million out of $715 million total. 2012
Presidential Race, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., http://www.opensecrets.org/
pres12/index.php#out (last visited May 22, 2012).
340. Small contributions accounted for $79 million out of $443 million total. Id.
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 85 Side A      12/12/2013   14:12:17
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 85 Side A      12/12/2013   14:12:17
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-2\NEB205.txt unknown Seq: 51 12-DEC-13 14:07
2013] LAST RITES 399
ute if a matching program exists, and their contributions will be more
effective.341
Large donors provide the majority of the money in politics.342
Without the support of the small group of people who supply the ma-
jority of political contributions, a candidate simply cannot finance his
campaign for office.  Even then-candidate Obama’s campaign in 2008
raised 74% of its funds from people giving more than $200, which was
only 1% lower than the 75% raised by President Bush in the 2004 elec-
tion.343  President Obama even received almost half (47%) of his funds
from contributions of $1,000 or more, which is historically low, but
still represents more money than his opponent John McCain raised in
the entire election.344  Without some form of public financing that in-
creases the power of small donors, like New York City’s small-donor
matching program, federal politics will continue to be dominated by
those with the means and motives to make large contributions to can-
didates.345  Small donors’ influence in elections and, therefore, over
candidates will not increase until there is a system that increases the
influence and effect of small contributions and small donors to match
that of large donors.
341. The influence of large donors is even more prevalent outside of presidential elec-
tions and in off-cycle elections.  In 2010, donors giving more than $200 made up
just .26% of the population. Donor Demographics 2010, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE
POLS., http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/donordemographics.php?cycle=2010
(last visited May 22, 2012).  The number of donors giving $2,400 or more (the
maximum limit to any one candidate) again gave the majority of all money to
candidates, parties, and PACs.  This group included only .05% of the population
but still contributed more than the remaining 99.95% of the population combined.
Id.  In 2012, all Senate candidates raised more than 64% of their total contribu-
tions from just .04% of the population.  Bob Herbert, Small Donors Could Change
Imbalance of Power, POLITICO (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/
04/small-donors-offer-fix-to-imbalance-of-power-90782.html.  Clearly small do-
nors cannot match the ability of a few large donors in terms of total contributions.
The numbers are even more staggering when looking at contributions to Super
PACs and other independent groups. In the 2012 election cycle, one person, Shel-
don Adelson, contributed $90 million, almost exclusively to independent groups.
2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS.,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=D (last visited May
22, 2013).  This means that it would take over 1.4 million small donors giving the
average contribution of $62 to equal the amount given by Sheldon Adelson alone.
Press Release, the Campaign Finance Institute, Reality Check: Obama Received
About the Same Percentage from Small Donors in 2008 as Bush in 2004 (Nov. 24,
2008), http://www.cfinst.org/press/preleases/08-11-24/Realty_Check_-_Obama_
Small_Donors.aspx.
342. Donor Demographics 2012, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., http://www.open-
secrets.org/overview/donordemographics.php?cycle=2012&filter=A (last visited
May 22, 2012) (showing how just over half of all political contributions came from
donors who give, in aggregate, at least $2,500 per election cycle).
343. Press Release, supra note 334.
344. Id.
345. See Herbert, supra note 341.
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To the extent that proposals exist to extend the small donor model
to the congressional level, the proposal that has garnered the most—
which, to be clear is not much—traction is known as the Fair Elec-
tions Now Act (FENA).346  The intention of FENA is to force candi-
dates to “seek support from their communities”—not special interests,
big money bundlers, lobbyists, and big donors.347  FENA seeks to in-
crease the influence of small donors as a check on the current influ-
ence of large donors and lobbyists by reducing their control over
campaign funding. Whether, in the current campaign expenditure cli-
mate, especially given the prevalence of independent groups, that nor-
mative goal is achievable under the terms of the Act is, at the very
least, a reasonable question.  Under the Act, qualifying congressional
candidates would receive an initial public grant, plus subsequent
grants in the form of multiple matching funds, four-to-one, of small
donor contributions collected during the election cycle.348  House of
Representatives candidates qualify for public financing under the
scheme by raising $50,000 in their home states from at least 1500 peo-
ple.349  U.S. Senate candidates would have to raise 10% of the initial
public grant from 2000 people, plus 500 people for each congressional
district in the state.350  Small donor contributions are limited to
$100.351
Qualified candidates would receive primary election funding and,
upon victory, additional funding for the general election at a level to
be competitive.352  House candidates would receive $900,000 in initial
public funding, split 40/60 between the primary and general elec-
tions.353  Senatorial candidates would receive $1,250,000 plus an ad-
ditional $250,000 per congressional district in the state, also split 40/
60 between the primary and general elections.354
The additional matching funds are available throughout the elec-
tion cycle on a four-to-one matching basis for every $100 or lower do-
nation raised, not to exceed three times the initial primary or general
election grant.355  Although a nonparticipating opponent’s spending
does not trigger the matching funds, the small-donor matching funds
theoretically provide an ongoing mechanism for participating candi-
346. Fair Elections Now, FAIR ELECTIONS NOW COALITION, http://action.fairelections
now.org/fairelections (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
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dates to respond to a well-financed opponent.356  Additionally, FENA
provides participating candidates with a 20% discount on the lowest
broadcast media rates.357  Senatorial candidates would receive
$100,000 in media vouchers per congressional district in the state.358
House of Representatives candidates would receive a single $100,000
media voucher.359  Both Senate and House candidates may, rather
than using the voucher, turn the voucher in to their national party
committee for cash.360
If adopted, the funding for FENA would come from a small percent-
age of large government contractor contracts in the case of senatorial
races and 10% of revenues generated from auctioning unused broad-
cast spectrum in the case of House races.361  Supporters of the propo-
sal predict that the scheme will cost between $700 and $850
million.362  Although the legislation has been previously intro-
duced,363 and is expected to be introduced again in 2013,364 there is
little reason to believe that FENA will be adopted any time soon.
Legally, FENA does not implicate Davis and Arizona Free Enter-
prise because the matching funds under the Act are not triggered by
opponent spending or outside expenditure support, but instead by
small donor contributions.365  Practically, however, FENA is con-
strained both by a lack of political will to pass it and by very real con-
cerns about its efficacy given the post-Citizens United spending
dynamics detailed earlier in this article.  Those challenges are exacer-
bated in campaigns for important offices that nonetheless represent
small populations—where, at least if the small donors are truly the
citizens of the jurisdiction, the pool of potential small donors is, well,
exceedingly small.  One consequence is that while the small-donor
matching model may work exceptionally well for candidates seeking
one of fifty-one city council seats in eight-million person New York
356. See id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. H.R. 1404 (112th): Fair Elections Now Act, Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/112/hr1404, (last visited Oct. 29, 2012); Fair Elections Now Act,
PUB. CAMPAIGN, www.publicampaign.org/fair-elections-now-act (last visited Feb.
8, 2013).  The Bill was introduced into the 112th Congress and gathered 102 cos-
ponsors (101 Democrats and one Republican) but failed to make it out of commit-
tee., H.R. 1404 (112th): Fair Elections Now Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.gov
track.us/congress/bills/112/hr1404, (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
364. Fair Elections Now, COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=
dkLNK1MQIwG&b=4773857 (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
365. Fair Elections Now, supra note 346.
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City,366 it does not particularly fit for candidates for one of the two
U.S. Senate seats representing North Dakota, population 699,628.367
As such, for a serious candidate, not knowing, ex ante, the magnitude
of directly adversarial and independent financial opposition he or she
will face, participation represents an extraordinary gamble.  Partici-
pation in FENA, or any other publicly financed program that limits
spending, may very well act as a signal to wealthy independent groups
to target the participating candidate.
Others suggest a more aggressive approach to federalizing a ver-
sion of small-donor-based public financing.  Larry Lessig, for example,
suggests a $6 billion proposal in which every voter was allocated a $50
“democracy voucher” that could be, in turn, allocated to “any candi-
date for Congress who agreed to one simple condition: the only money
that candidate would accept to finance his or her campaign would be
either ‘democracy vouchers’ or contributions from citizens capped at
$100.  No PAC money.  No $2,500 checks.  Small contributions
only.”368
Lessig’s program avoids the trigger mechanism found unconstitu-
tional in Free Enterprise but would still face serious constitutional
challenges.  The “democracy voucher” program could not be made
mandatory because it limits contributions and spending so it would
face the problem of being effective even in the current big money sys-
tem.  The program would have to present candidates with a chance at
not being outspent despite the fact that many current private contri-
butions made directly to candidates would likely shift to independent
groups.  The program would serve the anticorruption rationale as it
would eliminate big money contributions that can give rise to quid pro
quo corruption.  It also does not limit spending more than any other
public financing system, and the ability to raise additional contribu-
tions of less than $100 provides theoretically unlimited spending
power.  The Lessig voucher program, based on its voluntary nature,
could very well provide an interesting, albeit untested in both a consti-
tutional and practical sense, alternative to a small-donor matching
system.
While creating a viable campaign finance system in the given the
current system—including hostile precedent, political opposition, and
large independent expenditures—may seem impossible, some com-
366. About the Council, NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL, http://council.nyc.gov/html/about/
about.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2013); State & County QuickFacts: New York
(City), New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/
3651000.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (estimating the population of New York
City at 8.2 million people in 2011).
367. North Dakota, supra note 24 (estimating the population of North Dakota at
699,628 people in 2012).
368. Lessig, supra note 293, at A31 (discussing the democracy voucher program as a
solution to combating large contributions and independent expenditures).
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mentators believe that all hope is, in fact, not lost. Richard L. Hasen
notes that campaign financing may, as hard as it is to believe, be
saved by the very institution that has seemingly spelled its demise—
the Supreme Court.369 The campaign financing decisions have all
been 5–4 in favor of the conservatives.  The liberal-moderate Jus-
tices—Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—have all indicated
that they are in favor of limiting campaign contributions.  Two con-
servative justices—Kennedy and Scalia—are in their seventies and
one, if not both, may leave the bench over the next decade.  Hasen
suggests that if there is a Democratic president in office at the time of
either Scalia’s or Kennedy’s retirement, there is a good chance the
court will do a “180.” Future campaign finance decisions may still be
5–4, however, this time in favor of the liberals.370
V. CONCLUSION
The problems—both precedential and political—facing publicly fi-
nanced campaigns are serious.  Any publicly financed system must be
able to simultaneously address current realities ranging from unlim-
ited independent expenditures to hostile courts, precedent, and politi-
cal resistance.  Absent a constitutional amendment, and given the
Buckley independent expenditure dynamics now being fully realized
in the aftermath of Citizens United, a serious candidate cannot afford
not to wonder: would their slice of that (or another) $6 billion—or
some other pie in a different jurisdiction—be enough, not necessarily
to win, but to stand a competitive chance?  If not, then the absence of
matching funds, post-Arizona Free Enterprise, means that, in such a
scenario, the people’s interests are inevitably thwarted in precisely
the manner described at the outset of this article, in which the rheto-
ric of financial responsibility provides the vehicle for both sides to in-
dulge another $500 million in unnecessary cost to the actual, and
sadly underrepresented, citizens of the republic.371
369. Richard L. Hasen, After Scalia: Don’t Give Up on Campaign Finance Reform,
However Hopeless It Seems Now, SLATE (Feb. 21, 2013. 11:49 A.M.), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/02/campaign_finance_re
form_when_scalia_leaves_the_supreme_court.html.
370. Id.
371. See supra Introduction.
